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Preventing the Curse of Bigness Through 
Conglomerate Merger Legislation 
Robert H. Lande & Sandeep Vaheesan* 
ABSTRACT 
The antitrust laws, as they are presently interpreted, are incapable of 
blocking most of the very largest corporate mergers. They successfully 
blocked only three of the seventy-eight largest finalized mergers and 
acquisitions (defined as the acquired firm being valued at more than $10 
billion) that occurred between 2015 and 2019. The antitrust laws also would 
permit the first trillion-dollar corporation, Apple, to merge with the 
previously third largest corporation, Exxon/Mobil. In fact, today every U.S. 
corporation could merge until just ten were left—so long as each owned only 
10% of every relevant market. 
Even though the Congresses that enacted the anti-merger laws did so, 
among other aims, to limit the political power of corporations, today the 
federal antitrust agencies and courts interpret these laws only in terms of 
price and other economic effects within discrete markets. Under current 
merger practice, the enhanced political power of corporations is irrelevant. 
However, from Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders on the left, 
to President Trump and many others on the right, there is a renewed interest 
in using antitrust to control corporate size, structure, and practices. There is 
popular desire both to prevent large mergers and to break up existing 
companies, such as Facebook and Google, that achieved their dominant 
positions in part due to acquisitions. 
In light of recent developments within most of the political spectrum, this 
Article proposes model conglomerate merger legislation suitable for our era. 
This legislation would target every merger that exceeds clearly specified 
asset thresholds. We are proposing a law that would block every merger in 
which both firms have assets exceeding $10 billion, unless they spin-off assets 
so that their increase in size falls below this figure. This threshold would 
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block at most approximately fifteen to twenty-five of the largest mergers each 
year. 
This Article undertakes a legal, economic, and political analysis of 
conglomerate merger legislation. This demonstrates that our proposed 
legislation would: (1) Produce no significant losses in corporate efficiency; 
(2) Be clearer and more predictable than the existing anti-merger laws and 
thus would enhance the rule of law; and (3) Help prevent significant 
increases in corporate political power and other forms of non-economic 
power caused by the largest mergers. 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. antitrust laws today provide a very limited check on corporate 
consolidation. For example, they successfully blocked only three of the 
seventy-eight largest finalized mergers and acquisitions (defined as the 
smaller firm being valued at more than $10 billion by the acquirer) that 
occurred between 2015 and 2019.1 They also would permit the first trillion 
dollar corporation, Apple,2 to merge with the third largest (as of the summer 
of 2019), Exxon/Mobil.3 In fact, today every U.S. corporation could merge 
until just ten were left—so long as each owned only 10% of every relevant 
market.4 
 
1. In addition, many of these eighty-three mergers were permitted subject to relatively 
minor divestitures or conduct relief. See infra Appendix II. 
2. Rob Davies, Apple Becomes World’s First Trillion-Dollar Company, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/02/apple-becomes-worlds-first-
trillion-dollar-company [https://perma.cc/5WXR-NWCC]. Of course, the market capitalization 
value of Apple constantly fluctuates. 
3. See Erin Duffin, The 100 Largest Companies in the World by Market Value in 2018, 
STATISTA (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-the-
world-by-market-value/ [https://perma.cc/3MED-H6VZ]. If these corporations overlap to any 
potentially anticompetitive degree, such that the effects of the overlaps “may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,” the overlaps could be spun off. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 18 (2019). There also is a chance these companies could be found to compete in one or more 
relevant “data markets”—such as the market for the types of information on purchasers that could 
help sellers to market products and services. This type of overlap would be much more difficult 
to cure by a minor divestiture. Whether the courts today would find such “relevant data markets” 
to exist is, however, a relatively untested possibility. 
4. Indeed, in theory today it might even be possible for mergers to occur until five firms 
each controlled 20% of every market in the United States! For a general analysis of merger 
standards see Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the 
Importance of “Redundant” Competitors, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 783 (2018). 
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Why did the antitrust laws permit the largest merger to date—the merger 
that combined Time Warner and AOL—in which the acquired company was 
valued at $164 billion?5 Under the current interpretations of the antitrust 
laws, even the very largest corporations are free to merge so long as they 
operate in unrelated markets or compete only to a limited extent in related 
markets. Although the Congresses that enacted the anti-merger laws were 
motivated in part by the effects of corporate power on the political process,6 
the federal antitrust agencies and courts today interpret these laws only in 
terms of economic effects within discrete markets.7 Unfortunately, existing 
anti-merger enforcement appears to be insufficient even using the limited 
neoclassical economic criteria of stopping mergers that raise prices, reduce 
output or choice, or lower quality or innovation.8 For the antitrust agencies, 
the considerations of political power, including the absolute size of the 
corporations involved, are irrelevant. 
Senator Elizabeth Warren in 2019 proposed tighter merger restrictions on 
certain companies with more than $25 billion in sales,9 and said: “We need 
to enforce our antitrust laws, break up these giant companies that are 
dominating big tech, big pharma, big oil, all of them.”10 In 2017, Senator 
 
5. According to several sources, the biggest U.S. merger was America Online’s acquisition 
of Time Warner in 2000. E.g., Henry Fernandez, The 10 Largest Corporate Mergers in U.S. 
History, FOX BUSINESS (June 13, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/the-10-largest-
corporate-mergers-in-u-s-history [https://perma.cc/6898-JPSF]. The number reported by Fox 
Business was $164.75 billion. Id. 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2019). For a general analysis of how the mergers laws have been 
interpreted and implemented overall see Carstensen & Lande, supra note 4. 
8. See generally JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 148 (The MIT Press 2014). 
9. Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c 
[https://perma.cc/8XK7-PX45] (“Companies with an annual global revenue of $25 billion or more 
and that offer to the public an online marketplace, an exchange, or a platform for connecting third 
parties would be designated as ‘platform utilities.’ These companies would be prohibited from 
owning both the platform utility and any participants on that platform. . . . I will appoint regulators 
who are committed to using existing tools to unwind anti-competitive mergers” from companies 
and those they own including: Amazon (Whole Foods and Zappos), Facebook (WhatsApp and 
Instagram), Google (Waze, Nest, and DoubleClick)). 
10. See Ted Johnson, Democratic Candidates Differ on Ways To Rein in Facebook, Other 
Big Tech Firms, DEADLINE (Oct. 15, 2019, 7:55 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/10/democratic-
debate-facebook-elizabeth-warren-1202761256/ [https://perma.cc/UPF3-EXMU]. This alleged 
dominance was in part due to mergers. For example, Tim Wu noted: “In total, Facebook managed 
to string together 67 unchallenged acquisitions, which seems impressive, unless you consider that 
Amazon undertook 91 and Google got away with 214 (a few of which were conditioned).” TIM 
WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 123 (Columbia Global Reports 
2018). 
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Amy Klobuchar, together with three co-sponsors, introduced a Bill that 
would incorporate absolute size into merger analysis. 11  These concerns 
follow a precedent set four decades ago by Senator Ted Kennedy when he 
introduced a bill that would have prevented any merger between firms that 
both exceeded roughly $7.5 billion (in 2019 dollars) in assets,12 unless one of 
two exceptions applied.13 Its primary purpose was to help prevent increases 
in corporate political and social power.14 While libertarians may lament these 
bills as public or political incursions on private prerogatives, it is worth 
remembering that corporations are creatures of state action—endowed with 
special privileges such as limited liability and potential immortality through 
their charters.15 The public has the right to regulate institutions it created in 
the first place. 
In recent years, popular concerns about corporate power, which formed 
much of the impetus behind the enactment of the existing antitrust laws,16 
have reemerged. These public concerns include the political and social 
power17 possessed by the largest corporations. This apprehension has come 
from both the left and the right sides of the political spectrum.18 
 
11. Senator Klobuchar introduced S. 1812 to tighten the merger laws in a number of ways. 
See Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2017, S. 1812, 115th Cong. 
(2017). In particular, this Bill would mandate, for the first time, a more skeptical review of any 
acquisition of $5 billion or more, or of any acquisition exceeding $50 million by a firm with assets 
exceeding $100 billion. Id. For these transactions, the legislation would switch the burden of proof 
and require that the merging firms prove that the acquisition will not be reasonably likely to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly. Id. 
12. See Michael Pertschuk & Kenneth M. Davidson, What’s Wrong with Conglomerate 
Mergers?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1979) (discussing Proposed S. 600, Section 2(a)). This 
bill was designed to prevent clearly specified exceptionally large mergers. Id. A key requirement 
was that both corporations have more than $2 billion in assets. Id. at 20. If $2 billion in 1979 
dollars is adjusted by the Consumer Price Index, it would be the equivalent of $7,443 billion in 
March 2019 dollars. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=2%2C000.00&year1=197901&year2=201903 
[https://perma.cc/7XSJ-PFTC]. 
13. Senator Kennedy’s Bill contained an efficiencies defense. Pertschuk & Davidson, supra 
note 12, at 20. It also contained the provision that these mergers could proceed even without 
efficiencies, but only if the combined entity sold or spun off sufficient assets so that its overall 
size did not increase due to the merger. Id. Because of this provision, this legislation was often 
referred to as the “Cap-And-Spinoff” approach to merger enforcement. Id. at 17. 
14. Id.  
15. KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND 
INEQUALITY 47–76 (2019). 
16. For examples of the populist suspicion of the political power of large businesses, see 
infra Part II. 
17. An example of a relatively non-economic and non-political concern would be citizens’ 
privacy concerns. 
18. For examples from many different places on the political spectrum see infra Part III. 
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Considering these developments, Congress should revisit and revive 
conglomerate merger legislation. 19  This Article will propose model 
conglomerate merger legislation suitable for our era. This legislation should 
supplement existing merger law by targeting every merger that exceeds 
clearly specified asset thresholds, regardless of whether they involve direct 
competitors, firms in adjacent markets, or firms in unrelated industries.20 
We are proposing a law that would block every merger in which both firms 
have assets exceeding $10 billion, unless they spin-off assets so that their 
increase in size falls below this figure.21 This threshold would block at most22 
approximately fifteen to twenty-five mergers each year. 23  Reasonable 
approaches to the conglomerate merger problem could be stricter 24  or 
looser.25 The goal of this Article is stimulate debate in this area. 
This Article will undertake an updated legal, economic, and political 
analysis of conglomerate merger legislation. This analysis will demonstrate 
that our proposed legislation would: 1. Produce no significant losses in the 
productive efficiency of corporations; 2. Be clearer and more predictable than 
 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. This cap would apply to horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers and would 
complement existing law restricting horizontal and vertical mergers. For instance, a horizontal 
merger may violate both the Clayton Act and the law we propose. The proposal, however, would 
have the most impact on large mergers that are purely conglomerate in nature and may not be 
illegal under current anti-merger law. 
Our proposed legislation would only permit enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission. Congress could, of course, enact legislation that also allowed 
State and/or private enforcement. 
21. This figure should be adjusted yearly to account for inflation. 
22. Because our proposal would permit a merger to be consummated so long as the 
acquiring company spun off assets so that its overall size would increase by less than $10 billion, 
many large “above $10 billion” mergers could occur in large part. For example, suppose a $100 
billion firm purchased another firm for $14 billion. So long as the acquiring company spun off 
any assets—whether from the acquired firm or the acquiring firm—that exceeding $4 billion, the 
merger would not violate our proposal. We would expect this to happen in most cases involving 
acquisitions of less than $25 billion. We would not be surprised if $25 billion became the de facto 
threshold if our proposal were enacted. 
23. See Appendix II. 
24. For example, a $5 billion or $1 billion threshold could be used instead. Alternatively, 
the statute could focus upon the amounts of corporate sales, in addition to or instead of the 
amounts of corporate assets. Another possibility would be to block every merger by any firm with 
assets exceeding a clearly specified amount, such as $50 billion. This approach would have many 
advantages, including clarity and simplicity. Nevertheless, it is not our preferred alternative 
because if a $50 billion corporation purchased a company with assets of only $50 million, this 
would not cause a significant increment in its political power. 
25. Instead of a $10 billion threshold, Congress might decide only to ban mergers where 
both corporations had assets exceeding a larger figure, such as the $25 billion threshold suggested 
by Senator Warren, or even $50 billion. See Warren, supra note 9. A $50 billion threshold should 
at most affect a handful of mergers per year. See Appendix II. 
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the existing antitrust laws and thus will enhance the rule of law; and 3. Help 
prevent significant increases in corporate political power and other forms of 
non-economic power caused by corporate mergers. 
I. HOW MANY EXCEPTIONALLY LARGE MERGERS ARE ATTEMPTED 
AND HOW MANY ARE PREVENTED? 
With the caveats and uncertainties that are discussed in Appendix II, if our 
proposed legislation had been in effect, the following numbers of mergers 
might have been scrutinized and possibly blocked each year. The following 
figures are for the smaller of the two firms involved in transactions 
announced during individual years, in billions of dollars: 
 
 $100 B+ $75 B+ $50 B+ $25 B+ $10 B+ 
2019 0 1 7 13 24 
2018 0 0 1 6 16 
2017 1 1 3 6 14 
2016 1 3 4 7 14 
2015 2 3 8 14 24 
Total 4 8 23 46 92 
 
The current antitrust laws stop only a small percentage of these 
exceptionally large corporate mergers. With the caveats and uncertainties 
expressed in Appendix II, here is an overview of what happened to every 
merger from 2015–2019 in which both firms had assets of more than $10 
billion: 
Forty-two unchallenged and permitted in full 
Twenty-nine approved subject to spin offs and divestitures under 
U.S. antitrust law 
Two approved subject to a conduct-oriented consent decree under 
U.S. antitrust law 
Two challenged under U.S. antitrust law but eventually permitted 
in full 
Two blocked by a U.S. court on antitrust grounds 
One abandoned after U.S. antitrust challenge threatened or 
announced 
Two blocked on non-antitrust grounds 
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Three abandoned on non-antitrust grounds 
Nine pending      
Ninety-two total 
There are many ways to characterize and interpret this data. For example, 
one could decide to exclude the mergers still pending and the mergers 
blocked or abandoned on non-antitrust grounds. If this were done, then only 
three out of seventy-eight of these mergers could be characterized as being 
completely stopped (blocked or abandoned) because of the U.S. antitrust 
laws. 
II. WHY DO THE CURRENT ANTITRUST LAWS BLOCK SO FEW LARGE 
TRANSACTIONS? 
There is a simple answer to this question. The primary antitrust law that 
affects merger enforcement is the Clayton Act, which was written to prevent 
firms from acquiring rival companies or companies in a vertical relationship 
where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”26 Since the early 1980s, the 
federal antitrust agencies have broken with Supreme Court precedent27 and 
 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (West. 2019). Even though the existing anti-mergers law also apply to 
conglomerate mergers, the government only briefly enforced the law against those few 
conglomerate mergers that could be characterized as potential competition mergers, and only 
infrequently challenged vertical mergers. RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN 
AMERICA, 1888–1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 198 (1996). For a brief period in the 1960s 
through the early 1970s, the government successfully stopped some large conglomerate mergers 
on the basis of entrenchment, potential competition, and reciprocal dealing theories. E.g., FTC v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 
(1965). The government has, in general, stopped litigating non-horizontal mergers. Before the 
2017 government challenge to the vertical merger between AT&T and Time Warner, the 
government last litigated a vertical merger to final judgment in 1979. Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 
F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
27. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court summarized the legislative 
intent animating the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act. 370 U.S. 294, 315–16 (1962) (“The 
dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of 
what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy . . . 
[and] [t]hroughout the recorded discussion may be found examples of Congress’ fear not only of 
accelerated concentration of economic power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other 
values a trend toward concentration was thought to pose.”). 
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reinterpreted the anti-merger statute to focus exclusively on mergers’ effects 
on consumer welfare—an unsettled term.28 
The current interpretation of the Clayton Act (and antitrust laws in 
general) does not explicitly include political or other considerations not tied 
to specific markets.29 Exceptionally large mergers may give rise to political 
or privacy concerns, but the agencies seek to block these mergers only if it’s 
likely they will have substantial detrimental economic effects within clearly 
defined product and geographic markets. 30  As Section I discussed, the 
enforcers and the courts have concluded that very few exceptionally large 
mergers would adversely affect consumer welfare in ways that cannot be 
prevented by conduct-oriented or structural remedies.31  
In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress sought to, among other aims, 
restrict the social and political power of large corporations. The debates over 
the principal federal anti-merger statute focused on how corporate mergers 
led to increased corporate political power.32 During the 1914 Clayton Act 
 
28. Consumer welfare is a very broad and controversial term. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth 
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation 
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65 (1982) [hereinafter Lande, Wealth Transfers]. At its broadest 
it includes concerns with prices to consumers, the transfer of wealth from purchasers to firms with 
market power (aka the theft of consumers’ surplus), quality, variety, and choice. See id.; Robert 
H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing 
Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349 (2013); see also 
Eleanor M. Fox, The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists Are Kings?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 
281 (1983).  
29. See Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 28, at 127–30. Of course, the mergers of 
exceptionally large corporations could give rise to numerous indirect externalities, both economic 
and non-economic, but these normally are not evaluated under the antitrust laws. In unusual cases, 
moreover, a merger could affect privacy enough to affect competition within a market. See Robert 
H. Lande, The Microsoft-Yahoo Merger: Yes, Privacy is an Antitrust Concern 1–2 (Univ. of 
Baltimore Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-06, FTC: Watch No. 714, 2008), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121934 [https://perma.cc/XVX7-J4KS]. 
These cases could be evaluated using traditional antitrust tools. 
30. See generally Carstensen & Lande, supra note 4. 
31. Of course, many of these decisions have been controversial, and would have been 
decided differently if they had been reviewed by different judges. See, for example, the decision 
in United States v. AT&T Inc., which was upheld on appeal and denounced by the American 
Antitrust Institute. See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018); AAI 
Issues Statement on D.C. Circuit’s Rejection of AT&T/Time Warner Appeal, Says Time Is Ripe 




32. This material has been adapted from Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 28, at 127–
30. 
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debates, for example, one Representative condemned the discretionary 
political power of men like J.P. Morgan: 
[A]ll of the power represented by this wealth is lodged in the hands 
of a few men. Can anyone doubt the danger which such 
concentration permits? . . . It is useless to say that the power 
represented will never be used to the detriment of the American 
people. . . . [I]t is too great a power to be concentrated—it affords 
too great a temptation to frail humanity.33  
Congress also worried that the concentrated wealth and power of those 
who controlled large corporations could threaten the very fabric of the nation. 
The House Committee Report accompanying Section 8, which restricts 
interlocking directorships, warned that “[t]he concentration of wealth, 
money, and property in the United States under the control and in the hands 
of a few individuals or great corporations has grown to such an enormous 
extent that unless checked it will ultimately threaten the perpetuity of our 
institutions.”34 Acknowledging the possibility that anti-merger legislation, in 
theory, might sacrifice productive efficiency, one Senator nevertheless 
strongly condemned monopolies and trusts because “[t]hey divide our people 
 
33. 51 CONG. REC. 9186 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Helvering); see also id. at 14,536 (remarks 
of Senator Cummins). 
34. H.R. REP. NO. 627, at 19, 63d Cong. (2d Sess. 1914); see also 51 CONG. REC. 9086 
(1914) (remarks of Rep. Kelly) (“Enterprises with great capital have deliberately sought not only 
industrial domination but political supremacy as well. . . . Great combinations of capital for many 
years have flaunted their power in the face of the citizenship, they have forced their corrupt way 
into politics and government, they have dictated the making of laws or scorned the laws they did 
not like, they have prevented the free and just administration of law. In doing this they have 
become a menace to free institutions and must be dealt with in patriotic spirit without fear or 
favor.”). Representative Madden expressed the same concern, but in stronger language: “[T]he 
invisible Government which has controlled the visible government in this Nation for many years 
has been unscrupulous big business. . . . If this Nation is to be a Government of the people by 
crooked big business, the doom of our free institutions is assured.” Id. at 9087. Representative 
Nelson used equally striking words:  
As surely and rapidly as the properties of all the people pass into the hands of 
a few trust magnates, public sentiment, rapidly forming, when once fully 
aroused, will multiply the socialistic vote as a protest against monopoly 
privilege. And the day when the people must choose between public ownership 
of trusts for the benefit of all and the private ownership of the trusts for the 
privilege of the few, will witness the final triumph of socialism in this country. 
Therefore, we should act in our days of grace, while we are yet masters of our 
national destiny. 
Id. at 9167. 
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into classes, breed discontent and hatred, and in the end riot, bloodshed, and 
French revolutions.”35  
Similarly, during the 1950 Celler–Kefauver Act debates, many members 
of Congress expressed striking misgivings regarding undue corporate 
aggrandizement of power. They cited the alarming consequences of 
concentration abroad.36 For example, Senator Kefauver, a leading sponsor of 
the bill, stated: 
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other 
nations where mergers and concentrations have placed economic 
control in the hands of very few people is too clear to pass over 
easily. A point is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching 
that point in this country, where the public steps in to take over 
when concentration and monopoly gain too much power. The taking 
over by the public through its government always follows one or 
two methods and has one or two political results. It either results in 
a Fascist state or the nationalization of industries and thereafter a 
Socialist or Communist state.37 
It is perhaps ironic that the antitrust laws, under present interpretation, 
cannot prevent some extremely large mergers that could lead to the very types 
of political and social problems that motivated the enactment of these laws. 
A few scholars have argued that the Clayton and FTC Acts can be used to 
stop pure conglomerate mergers on the basis of size alone. 38  Under the 
 
35. 51 CONG. REC. 15,955 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Borah). 
36. 95 CONG. REC. 11,486 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (“I want to point out the danger 
of this trend toward more and better combines. I read from a report filed with former Secretary of 
War Royall as to the history of the cartelization and concentration of industry in Germany: 
‘Germany under the Nazi set-up built up a great series of industrial monopolies in steel, rubber, 
coal and other materials. The monopolies soon got control of Germany, brought Hitler to power 
and forced virtually the whole world into war.’”). It should be noted that Representative Celler’s 
interpretation of the historical events which led to Hitler’s rise to power is by no means universally 
shared. See, e.g., ALAN BULLOCK, HITLER: A STUDY IN TYRANNY (1962).  
37. 96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver). These strong views were not 
expressed only by the principal sponsors of the amendment. See, e.g., id. at 16,446 (remarks of 
Sen. O’Mahoney) (“Collectivism is moving forward apace throughout the world, and industrial 
collectivism leads inevitably to political collectivism. That I would like to avoid.”). See id. at 
16,503–04 (remarks of Sen. Aiken) (“All of us know too well what has happened in countries 
where opportunity has been vested in the hands of a few. The result has been that either 
socialization or a totalitarian form of government has taken over . . . .”).  
38. See Peter C. Carstensen & Nina H. Questal, Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act To Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 841–42 
(1978) (“This Article will demonstrate that section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, in 
light of its legislative history and evolving Supreme Court interpretation, is an appropriate 
mechanism for dealing with conglomerate mergers.”); Harlan M. Blake, Conglomerate Mergers 
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dominant view of antitrust today, however, conglomerate mergers—indeed 
nearly all mergers of any kind—are treated as competitively benign and legal 
under the antitrust laws.39 Our proposed legislation would thus revisit and 
restore the progressive-populist aims of antitrust. This time, however, these 
concerns would be enacted expressly into law and not be susceptible to 
administrative and judicial reinterpretation.40 
III. THE LARGEST MERGERS LEAD TO CORPORATE POWER THAT 
CONCERNS MANY PEOPLE IN VIRTUALLY EVERY PART OF THE 
POLITICAL SPECTRUM 
Corporate size often translates to political power. An extensive body of 
research has found that firm size is correlated with more political activity.41 
Larger firms make larger contributions to political campaigns and devote 
more resources to lobbying members of Congress and government agencies.42 
 
and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 570 (1973) (“But the antitrust laws, including 
section 7, have since their beginnings been directed towards an even more fundamental objective: 
the prevention of the destruction or erosion of the competitive system, a form economic 
organization in which economic power in any form should not be permitted to limit the freedom 
of equally efficient smaller entrepreneurs to compete, on fair and equal terms, with larger firms 
or groupings of firms; and the avoidance of the political consequences of such an impairment of 
the traditional system.”).  
39. Professor John Kwoka has documented a steady decline in enforcement against even 
horizontal mergers in concentrated markets. John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the 
Safe Harbor in Merger Review: False Positives or Unwarranted Concerns?, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 
837, 867 (2017). 
40. Consider the radically different interpretations of the Sherman Act over time. Its open-
ended text gives enforcers and judges broad power to reinterpret it. In 1958, the Supreme Court 
described the Sherman Act as 
a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the 
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of 
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest 
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive 
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. 
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Two decades later, despite no revision to 
the statute, the Court, following a substantial change in its composition, stated that the Sherman 
Act is a “consumer welfare prescription.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) 
(quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)). 
 41. See, e.g., Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: 
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564 (2014); Lester M. Salamon 
& John J. Siegfried, Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure 
on Public Policy, 71 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1026, 1031 (1977). 
 42. Gilens & Page, supra note 41; Salamon & Siegfried, supra note 41. 
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Judicial reinterpretations of the First Amendment have granted corporate 
political activity broad constitutional protection. 43  Their power is not 
confined to these “narrow” political activities. Large businesses also use their 
wealth power to fund sympathetic media coverage and scholarly research. 
This corporate political activity benefits executives and shareholders at the 
expense of the rest of society. 
Corporate power in politics and public life is not an academic concern and 
today attracts critics from across much of the political spectrum.44 A large 
segment of the public is deeply concerned about corporate clout and influence 
in American politics. From the progressive left to the nationalist or 
conservative right, many individuals and organizations have expressed 
worries about powerful corporations capturing the political system and using 
it to advance their narrow aims. An ideologically diverse set of figures and 
groups have raised concerns about the political power of large corporations 
and started offering remedies. 
A. Corporate Size Translates to Political and Economic Power 
Corporate size often translates to political and economic power. An 
extensive body of research has found that firm size is correlated with political 
activity.45 Larger firms make larger contributions to political campaigns and 
other activities and devote more resources to lobbying members of Congress 
and government agencies. 46  They can also use their power to fund 
sympathetic media coverage and scholarly research.47 This corporate political 
activity has tangible benefits for executives and shareholders. An influential 
2014 study found that members of Congress in voting on bills are responsive 
to the views of two groups: large businesses and the wealthy.48 In contrast, 
 
43. Consider the Supreme Court’s invalidation of federal restrictions on the use of general 
corporate funds for political activity. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). The Supreme Court has also immunized anticompetitive and other unfair corporate 
petitioning of government from antitrust liability. E. R.R. Presidents’ Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 
(1965). 
44. The connection between corporate size and corporate political power has long animated 
antimonopoly champions. See, e.g., LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: 
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 18 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935). 
 45. See, e.g., Gilens & Page, supra note 41; Salamon & Siegfried, supra note 41. 
 46. Gilens & Page, supra note 41; Salamon & Siegfried, supra note 41. 
 47. Matthew A. Baum & Yuri M. Zhukov, Media Ownership and News Coverage of 
International Conflict, 31 POL. COMM. 36 (2019); Alice Fabbri et al., The Influence of Industry 
Sponsorship on the Research Agenda: A Scoping Review, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e9 (2018). 
48. Gilens & Page, supra note 41. 
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they are largely indifferent to the political concerns and preferences of the 
middle and working classes.49 
Large firms exercise political power through campaign contributions. An 
extensive body of empirical literature has found that large firms make larger 
campaign contributions to members of Congress and political action 
committees than small firms do.50 Campaign contributions are an important 
way to build and maintain political influence. While the findings on the 
question are mixed, campaign contributions may increase the likelihood that 
the member’s votes and other actions are aligned with the donor’s interests.51  
Political contributions can give corporate donors access to those in power. 
Lending credence to what research had found,52 Mick Mulvaney, the current 
director of the Office of Management and Budget and former acting director 
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, openly admitted this dynamic 
in a speech before bank lobbyists.53 He stated that, as a member of Congress, 
he granted preferential access to lobbyists who had donated to his political 
campaigns.54 
Large firms also wield political power through lobbying, an arguably 
much more important form of political activity than political contributions.55 
They often have large staffs of lawyers and lobbyists to present their 
messages to politicians and regulators.56 Relative to smaller firms, large firms 
devote more resources to lobbying activity. 57  This lobbying allows 
 
 49. Id. 
50. Wendy L. Hansen & Neil J. Mitchell, Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate 
Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 891 (2000); David M. Hart, Why Do Some Firms Give? Why Do Some Give a Lot? 
High-Tech PACs, 1977-1996, 63 J. POL. 1230 (2001). 
51. Matthew D. Hill, G. Wayne Kelly & G. Brandon Lockhart, Determinants and Effects of 
Corporate Lobbying, 42 FIN. MGMT. 931, 954 (2013). 
52. Id. 
 53. Renae Merle, Mulvaney Discloses ‘Hierarchy’ for Meeting Lobbyists, Saying Some 





55. Hui Chen, David C. Parsley & Ya-Wen Yang, Corporate Lobbying and Financial 
Performance (Oct. 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014264 
[https://perma.cc/GH9L-WA52]. 
56. See, e.g., Jade Scipioni, Amazon Is Now the Biggest Corporate Lobbyist in Washington, 
FOX BUSINESS (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/amazon-is-now-the-
biggest-corporate-lobbyist-in-washington [https://perma.cc/S5T6-HTAU].  
57. Richard Borghesi & Kiyoung Chang, The Determinants of Effective Corporate 
Lobbying, 39 J. ECON. & FIN. 606, 615 (2015); William R. Kerr, William F. Lincoln & Prachi 
Mishra, The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POLICY 343, 346 (2014). 
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corporations to shape the narrative around an issue and influence members of 
Congress and regulators. Lobbying is often an effective strategy for casting 
doubt on the public benefits of legislation and regulation. 58  Corporate 
lobbyists can create counter-narratives that proposed legislation restricting 
their client’s activities would either not advance or undermine the public 
interest.59 For instance, despite triggering the worst economic crisis in nearly 
eighty years, large banks and financial institutions in the United States, 
through all-encompassing lobbying and public relations blitz, subsequently 
avoided structural breakups and significant restrictions on their activity.60 
Indeed, the present weak enforcement of antitrust may, in part, be a 
product of corporate power and influence over the federal antitrust agencies.61 
“Regulatory capture” occurs when a regulatory agency or enforcer is so 
greatly influenced by businesses that it fails to act in the public’s interest.62 
Instead it acts in ways that benefits the players in the industry that the 
regulators were charged with policing.63 One possible cause of regulatory 
capture is that the agency often has limited resources compared to the 
regulated companies. 64 When the regulated business is a multi-billion-dollar 
company, the disparity in resources can be especially large and regulatory 
capture becomes more probable.65 
 
58. Michael Hadani, Jean-Philippe Bonardi & Nicolas M. Dahan, Corporate Political 
Activity, Policy Uncertainty, and Firm Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis, 15 STRATEGIC ORG. 338 
(2017). 
59. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, 
FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991). Moreover, there sometimes is said to be an “iron triangle” 
of Congress, industry and the federal government. See Paul M. Johnson, A Glossary of Political 
Economy Terms: Iron Triangles, AUBURN UNIV. (2015), 
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/iron_triangles [https://perma.cc/Z9M7-PZBU]. The 
federal government gives out a lot of special interest favors to Congressmen, and the bureaucrats, 
especially the higher-ups, go along, often in order to set themselves up for after they leave 
government service. Id. Lobbying occurs across industry and market lines, and conglomerate 
mergers can help produce a united front against reformers asking for accountability of government 
policies. Id. 
60. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps 
Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (2012). 
61. See Will Kenton, Regulatory Capture, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp [https://perma.cc/5SUR-AHG4]. 
62. Id.; see also Cary Coglianese, The Elusiveness of Regulatory Capture, The Regulatory 
Review (July 5, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/07/05/coglianese-the-elusiveness-of-
regulatory-capture/ [https://perma.cc/LEZ6-3G7L]. 
 63. Kenton, supra note 61. 
64. Tejvan Pettinger, Regulatory Capture, ECON. HELP (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/141040/economics/regulatory-capture/ 
[https://perma.cc/SCR6-4WQR]. 
 65. See generally id. 
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The FTC and DOJ’s reluctance and unwillingness to challenge some huge 
mergers could, in part, be caused by the considerable influence massive 
companies have over them and the political environment in which they 
operate. For instance, FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra recently voiced 
concern over the power of big tech in a trade regulation context, stating: “All 
too often, the government is too captured by those incumbents that use their 
power to dictate their preferred policies.”66 Consistent with the “capture” 
theory, mergers can produce large companies with substantial resources to 
hire the requisite numbers of lawyers, lobbyists, and experts to “capture” a 
regulatory agency or enforcer. 
The power of large corporations extends beyond the political, regulatory, 
and legal realms. Their power can be characterized as hegemonic. They can 
shape the parameters of public debate through a variety of means. They use 
their advertising dollars to boost supportive outlets and voices and 
marginalize critical ones67—and even co-opt individual and organizational 
voices that are conventionally perceived as progressive.68 They also own 
media outlets (think of Amazon founder Jeff Bezos and his ownership of the 
Washington Post) and fund think tanks that can propagate their preferred 
narrative on a range of issues.69 Big businesses have also become adept at 
manipulating academic debates to their own ends, donating to universities, 
sponsoring new academic centers, and paying ideologically-aligned scholars 
to produce academic defenses.70 Indeed, present-day antitrust embodies the 
 
66. U.S. Rohit Chopra Is Concerned that the Government Is “Captured” by Big Tech, 





67. See Soontae An & Lori Bergen, Advertiser Pressure on Daily Newspapers: A Survey of 
Advertising Sales Executives, 36 J. ADVER. 111 (2007). 
68. See Lee Fang, Civil Rights Groups, Funded by Telecoms, Back Donald Trump’s Plan 
To Kill Net Neutrality, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/02/13/naacp-trump-netneutrality/ [https://perma.cc/3NYS-3Z4Z]; 
Editorial, How to Promote a Merger, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/opinion/09sat2.html [https://perma.cc/GL3U-ZMJE]. 
69. Eric Lipton & Brooke Williams, How Think Tanks Amplify Corporate America’s 
Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/us/politics/think-
tanks-research-and-corporate-lobbying.html [https://perma.cc/CPB3-YL6E]. 
70. Lee Fang, The Scholars Who Shill for Wall Street, THE NATION (Oct. 23, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/scholars-who-shill-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/G8RX-
U29L]; Erica L. Green & Stephanie Saul, What Charles Koch and Other Donors to George Mason 
University Got for Their Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/us/koch-donors-george-mason.html 
[https://perma.cc/7WGV-H3E2]. 
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extraordinary influence of corporations. Over the past several decades, 
corporate-funded economists and lawyers have played an outsized role in 
antitrust debates.71 
Furthermore, corporate size confers power through the control of 
economic resources. At a large corporation, a handful of individuals—
executives and directors—make decisions that affect entire cities, regions, 
and even the nation. A decision to open a plant in one city, instead of another, 
or to relocate a plant from the United States to a foreign country can affect 
large numbers of people. Senator Sherman recognized how concentration of 
assets in a few hands amounted to private government. 72  He asked his 
colleagues to “consider . . . whether, on the whole, it is safe in this country to 
leave the production of property, the transportation of our whole country, to 
depend upon the will of a few men sitting at their council board in the city of 
New York.”73 
Corporate size means that every nominally private decision has major 
public implications.74 They can use their control of key resources to stop 
unfavorable government action and induce favorable action.75 
Consider the recent contest among states and cities to host Amazon’s 
second headquarters. Amazon invited state and local governments across the 
country to compete for this second headquarters in exchange for a pledge to 
create 50,000 local jobs.76 States and cities showered Amazon with a range 
 
71. Jesse Eisinger & Justin Elliott, These Professors Make More Than a Thousand Bucks 
an Hour Peddling Mega-Mergers, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/these-professors-make-more-than-thousand-bucks-hour-
peddling-mega-mergers [https://perma.cc/FWF8-QXQZ]; STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 85–92 (2008) 
(documenting Henry Manne’s success in raising money from large corporations to build the law 
and economics movement and help challenge then-prevailing thinking on antitrust law). For a 
documentation of the effects of the law and economics movement on judicial decision-making, 
see generally Elliott Ash, Daniel L. Chen & Suresh Naidu, Ideas Have Consequences: The Effect 
of Law and Economics on American Justice (June 26, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992782 [https://perma.cc/7BXT-NPKH]. 
 72. 21 Cong. Rec. 2570 (1890). 
73. Id. 
 74. See generally James W. Brock, Economic Concentration and Economic Power: John 
Flynn and a Quarter-Century of Mergers, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 681 (2011). 
75. Id. at 728. 
76. Kim Hjelmgaard, Mike Snider & Elizabeth Weise, Amazon To Add Second 
Headquarters with up to 50,000 Jobs in Grab for Talent, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2017, 7:47 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/07/amazon-plans-second-headquarters-
dubbed-hq-2/640861001/ [https://perma.cc/WK5J-NJP8]. 
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of carrots amounting to billions of dollars in tax incentives.77 Exemplifying 
the lengths to which governments were willing to go to lure Amazon, New 
York Governor Andrew Cuomo (half-) jokingly even offered to change his 
first name to Amazon if Amazon chose New York City.78  This frenzied 
competition illustrates the power of a large corporation over democratically 
elected governments. And this episode is not an outlier but representative of 
how large corporations use their power and the threat of relocation to pressure 
and twist governments for their own ends.79 
B. Growing Political and Public Concern About Corporate Power 
Public recognition of, and concern about, corporate political power is 
growing. An increasing number of politicians and public figures are focused 
on the political and social—as well as economic—power of large businesses. 
This concern is not limited to one portion of the political spectrum. A diverse 
set of voices and organizations are calling for tackling monopoly and 
oligopoly power in American society. 
Prominent liberal and progressive voices have demanded action to curb 
the economic and political power of large corporations. Many Democrats 
have made strengthening anti-merger and anti-monopoly law a key pillar of 
 
77. Spencer Soper, Amazon Is Under Attack for Seeking Tax Break in Exchange for HQ2, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 7, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-
07/amazon-s-headquarters-bake-off-puts-it-in-corporate-welfare-spotlight 
[https://perma.cc/F48X-32M9]. 
78. Karen Weise & J. David Goodman, Amazon Plans to Split HQ2 Between Long Island 
City, N.Y., and Arlington, Va., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/technology/amazon-second-headquarters-split.html 
[https://perma.cc/GV4Y-CMJN]. 
79. John Browne, the former CEO of BP, described this dynamic in an interview with The 
Wall Street Journal. 
We do get the seat at the table because of our scope and size, whether we are 
the second or the third largest [oil] company is of very little import, but we’re 
certainly up there and we operate in places which are important to the United 
States government, and the United States government is important to us. We 
have large numbers of employees in the United States. That’s very important 
in a political system. And they are highly concentrated. So we have a very 
significant presence in Texas, Illinois, Alaska, and California. These are 
important because our employees are voters. 
BP Won’t Abandon Driving Force, Interview with John Browne, Wall St. J. (Nov. 25, 2003). For 
an in-depth analysis of one company’s domestic and international mobility, see generally 
JEFFERSON COWIE, CAPITAL MOVES: RCA’S SEVENTY-YEAR QUEST FOR CHEAP LABOR (2001). 
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their agenda.80 As mentioned in the introduction, Senator Amy Klobuchar 
introduced an anti-merger bill that would establish a presumption of illegality 
involving mergers that combined more than $5 billion in assets.81 This bill 
would target corporate size directly, although it features a large exemption 
for pure conglomerate mergers.82 
Senator Bernie Sanders weighed in against the AT&T/Time Warner 
merger and identified the further agglomeration of power as a principal evil 
of the combination. 83  He stated this consolidation “represents a gross 
concentration of power that runs counter to the public good.”84 And in early 
October 2018, Sanders introduced a bill that would break up the largest 
financial institutions in the United States and establish a cap on size going 
forward.85 Senator Sanders also promised to combat the excesses of large 
firms in the agricultural sector, stating that they are devastating to the small 
farmer and are a direct cause of mass unemployment, lower wages, massive 
wealth inequality, and a host of social problems. 86  In his October 2019 
Corporate Accountability and Democracy plan, presidential candidate 
 
80. Matthew Yglesias, Democrats’ Push for a New Era of Antitrust Enforcement, 
Explained, VOX (Jul. 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/7/31/16021844/antitrust-better-deal [https://perma.cc/H8ZD-DN85]. 
81. See S. 1812, 116th Cong. (2017). 
82. Id. Under this bill, the merging parties could overcome the presumption of illegality if 
they can show, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that the effect of the acquisition will not be 
to tend to materially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly or a monopsony.” Id. § 3. 
This would ensure that pure conglomerate mergers could be pursued, largely unchecked. 
 83. Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders), TWITTER (Oct. 23, 2016, 2:03 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SenSanders/status/790297619788685316 [https://perma.cc/5G7U-6LLG]. 
84. Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders), TWITTER (June 12, 2018, 4:49 PM), 
https://twitter.com/sensanders/status/1006684905554706438?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/8ZTD-QYBL]. 
85. Press Release, Bernie Sanders, Sanders, Sherman Introduce Legislation To Break Up 
Too Big To Fail Financial Institutions (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sanders-sherman-introduce-
legislation-to-break-up-too-big-to-fail-financial-institutions [https://perma.cc/PZ3F-LCC7]. 
86. Bernie Sanders, Opinion, Bernie Sanders: I’ll Fight for Farmers Against Powerful 
Agribusiness, DES MOINES REG. (Mar. 28, 2019, 11:06 AM), 
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/caucus/2019/03/28/bernie-
sanders-president-2020-caucus-agribusiness-factory-farming-rural-america-iowa-flood-trump-
ceo/3297096002/ [https://perma.cc/5L3D-WWBJ] (“When we are in the White House, we are 
going to strengthen antitrust laws that defend farmers from the corporate middlemen that stand 
between the food grower and the consumer, and have now become so big and powerful that they 
can squeeze farmers for everything they’re worth. We must end the absurd situation where the 
top four packing companies now control more than 80 percent of the beef market, 63 percent of 
the pork market, and 53 percent of the chicken market. We must help communities where there 
is a single buyer, meaning farmers are at the mercy of a corporation that’s effectively forcing 
them to use only the company’s feed and livestock.”). 
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Sanders condemned the present system in which “a small group of ultra-
wealthy CEOs are making the decisions that increasingly determine our 
economic, environmental and political future.”87 
Senator Elizabeth Warren has offered extensive critiques of corporate 
power, citing undue political influence as one of the evils of corporate 
bigness.88 In a keynote address at a conference hosted by the Open Markets 
Institute in December 2017, Senator Warren warned that “[c]oncentrated 
market power also translates into concentrated political power—the kind of 
power that can capture our government. And that’s exactly what’s happening, 
as President Trump and the Republicans in Congress bow to the power and 
influence of these industrial giants and financial titans.”89 Warren promised 
that if elected president, she would break up Amazon, Facebook, and 
Google.90 She published a detailed plan to break up big tech companies, 
including the creation of a threshold of $25 billion in annual revenue, above 
which companies would be subject to restrictions and regulations including 
mandatory divestitures of certain portions of the company. 91  Facebook 
allegedly removed Warren’s political ads posted on Facebook that called for 
breaking up Facebook.92 
Warren also called for breaking up some of the biggest farming 
corporations “so that they not only do not have that kind of economic power, 
 
 87. Bernie Sanders, Corporate Accountability and Democracy, BERNIE 2020, 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/ 
[https://perma.cc/UXF8-TGBA]. 
 88. Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Three Ways To Remake the American Economy for All, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2017, 2:47 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/06/elizabeth-warren-monopolies-
american-economy [https://perma.cc/MGS4-PVVC]. 
89. Id.  
90. Sean Moran, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Breaking Up Amazon, Facebook, Google, 
BREITBART (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/03/08/elizabeth-warren-
proposes-breaking-up-amazon-facebook-google/ [https://perma.cc/52WY-TTQG]. 
91. Warren, supra note 9 (“To restore the balance of power in our democracy, to promote 
competition, and to ensure that the next generation of technology innovation is as vibrant as the 
last, it’s time to break up our biggest tech companies.”). 
92. Sanjana Karanth, Facebook Temporarily Removed Elizabeth Warren Ads Urging 
Breakup of Tech Giants, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/elizabeth-warren-facebook-
ads_n_5c86fbb4e4b08d5b7864b594 [https://perma.cc/35LC-FD6W] (“Curious why I think FB 
has too much power? Let’s start with their ability to shut down a debate over whether FB has too 
much power. Thanks for restoring my posts. But I want a social media marketplace that isn’t 
dominated by a single censor.”). 
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so that they’re wiping out competition, so they’re taking all the profits for 
themselves . . . but also so that they don’t have that kind of political power.”93 
These figures are not outliers but are representative of a growing 
antimonopoly philosophy among Democrats, liberals, and progressives. 
Others have echoed the concerns expressed by Senators Klobuchar, Sanders, 
and Warren. (Former) Representative (and current Minnesota Attorney 
General) Keith Ellison and sitting Representative Ro Khanna established an 
Antitrust Caucus and called for antitrust enforcers to look beyond just 
consumer welfare. 94  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the Democratic 
representative for New York’s 14th Congressional district, has repeatedly 
voiced concerns about the political might of large financial institutions.95 
Senator Cory Booker has lamented the “incredible concentration of economic 
and political power in this country” 96  and introduced a bill that would 
establish a moratorium on corporate mergers in agriculture. 97  Former 
Colorado governor and former presidential candidate John Hickenlooper has 
called for a major revival in antimonopoly enforcement.98 
Indeed, many Democrats have criticized the political power of banks since 
at least the 2007–08 financial crisis. In early 2009, just six months after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the start of the worst financial crisis in 
eighty years, Senator Richard Durbin famously observed that “the banks—
hard to believe in a time when we’re facing a banking crisis that many of the 
 
93. Alexandra Jaffe, Elizabeth Warren and Amy Klobuchar Both Agree on Breaking Up 
‘Big Agriculture’ Monopolies, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 30, 2019, 7:22 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/warren-klobuchar-agree-on-breaking-up-big-ag-2019-3 
[https://perma.cc/V2DQ-33LN]. 
94. Tess Townsend, Keith Ellison and the New ‘Antitrust Caucus’ Want To Know Exactly 
How Bad Mergers Have Been for the American Public, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 4, 2017), 
http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/12/antitrust-bill-from-keith-ellison-seek-info-on-mergers.html 
[https://perma.cc/2A82-HJ9P]. 
95. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Curb Wall Street Gambling: Restore Glass Steagall, 
OCASIO2018.COM, https://ocasio2018.com/issues [https://perma.cc/NS6S-W8DJ]. 
96.  Open Market Inst., Remarks by Senator Cory Booker at “A Right to Compete: Are 
Monopolies Crushing Entrepreneurship?”, YOUTUBE (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PLl7VSnPfVKIgkUpV_vGIcZrZAJETwdovs&v=kLR9tZ
Qyk30&feature=emb_logo [https://perma.cc/XV9Z-Y59W]. 
97. Press Release, Cory Booker, Booker Introduces Bill To Place Moratorium on Ag 
Mergers (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=844 
[https://perma.cc/N7U5-TZZ7]. 
98. John Hickenlooper, John Hickenlooper: Leveling the Playing Field for Small 
Businesses, MEDIUM (Apr. 25, 2019), https://medium.com/@johnhickenlooper/john-
hickenlooper-leveling-the-playing-field-for-small-businesses-467fd6c3ece 
[https://perma.cc/272J-LAJ2]. 
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banks created—are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And they 
frankly own the place.”99 
Among academics and commentators, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman 
have repeatedly sounded the alarm about the pervasive market power 
problem. Stiglitz has opined that “America has a monopoly problem—and 
it’s huge” and cited the political power of large corporations as subverting 
democracy. 100  Krugman has similarly recognized the corrosive political 
power of large corporations. 101  Former Secretary of Labor, Harvard 
professor, and political commentator Robert Reich applauded Elizabeth 
Warren’s announced intention to break up big tech and predicted that 
breaking them up would allow for more privacy, decentralization of 
information, and more innovation. 102  Barry Lynn, director of the Open 
Markets Institute think tank, has sounded the alarm that tech giants like 
Google and Facebook are a threat to core democratic institutions.103 Zephyr 
Teachout, a progressive law professor, promised that if elected Attorney 
General of New York she would explore breaking up Google and Facebook 
using New York state antitrust laws.104 
 
99. Ryan Grim, Dick Durbin: Banks “Frankly Own the Place”, HUFFINGTON POST (May 
25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/dick-durbin-banks-
frankly_n_193010.html [https://perma.cc/FAV3-28HV]. 
100. Joseph E. Stiglitz, America Has a Monopoly Problem—and It’s Huge, NATION (Oct. 23, 
2017) https://www.thenation.com/article/america-has-a-monopoly-problem-and-its-huge/ 
[https://perma.cc/99YF-JNL8]. 
101. Paul Krugman, Challenging the Oligarchy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/robert-reich-challenging-oligarchy/ 
[https://perma.cc/P67B-78F7]. 
102. Robert Reich, Elizabeth Warren Is Right—We Must Break Up Facebook, Google and 
Amazon, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2019, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/09/elizabeth-warren-break-up-
facebook-google-amazon [https://perma.cc/N9AJ-5BDW] (“Like the robber barons of the first 
Gilded Age, those of the second have amassed fortunes that gave them unparalleled influence 
over politicians and the economy.”). 
103. Russell Brandom, The Anti-Monopoly Case Against Google: A Conversation with Open 
Markets’ Barry Lynn, VERGE (Sept. 5, 2017, 2:55 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/5/16243868/google-monopoly-antitrust-open-markets-barry-
lynn [https://perma.cc/NX35-DBJH] (“It’s important to talk about monopoly power in general 
because monopolies are a threat to our democracy and to our basic liberties and to our 
communities. Monopolization, this concentration of wealth and power, is a threat to everything 
that is America — everything we established America to ensure.”). 
104. Brian Fung, Time To Break Up Google and Facebook, Says New York Attorney General 
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Conservatives in the United States are generally supportive of, and 
deferential toward, big business interests. Conservative thinkers have indeed 
played a major role in weakening the antitrust laws and allowing 
consolidation and monopolization across the economy.105  In the name of 
“free markets,” conservative politicians and commentators typically favor 
policies that support large corporations and place few restrictions on them.106 
Nonetheless, more and more conservative voices are starting to raise 
concerns about corporate power. At present, many of the attacks reflect anger 
at certain companies, more than corporate power in general. Much of the 
conservative criticism appears driven by the perceived politics of their 
executives and employees more than a distrust of large corporations and their 
power in general. For example, Google is viewed as supportive of the 
Democratic Party and some liberal causes and it has drawn significant 
criticism from the right. 107  Whatever the underlying motivation though, 
skepticism of large corporations, or at least a subset of them, is a growing 
strand of thought on the right. 
At least on the surface, the Trump administration reflects this rising 
antimonopoly tendency among conservatives. President Trump has 
repeatedly attacked certain powerful corporations.108 He has criticized the 
power of Amazon and its founder and chief executive officer, Jeff 
Bezos. 109 He has also condemned vertical integration in 
 
105. See e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
106. Zach Carter, The GOP’s Vision of Free Markets Looks a Lot Like Donald Trump’s Real 
Estate Swindle, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19, 2018, 6:24 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-paul-ryan-free-enterprise-
cronyism_us_5bca274be4b0d38b5877e8b1 [https://perma.cc/WT9C-6R69]. 
107. E.g., John Hinderaker, It’s Official: Google Is a Democratic Party Front, POWERLINE 
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2018/09/its-official-google-is-a-
democratic-party-front.php [https://perma.cc/A94Y-27Z6]. 
 108. Danielle Wiener-Bronner & Julia Horowitz, Amazon and 16 Other Companies Trump 
Has Attacked Since His Election, CNN (Apr. 4, 2018, 6:47 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/04/news/companies/trump-companies-attacks/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/E6GQ-A3LS]. 
 109. Donald Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 29, 2018, 4:57 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/979326715272065024?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/4VFV-6W5M] (“I have stated my concerns with Amazon long before the 
Election. Unlike others, they pay little or no taxes to state & local governments, use our Postal 
System as their Delivery Boy (causing tremendous loss to the U.S.), and are putting many 
thousands of retailers out of business!”); see also David Goldman, Trump’s Latest Tweet Takes 
Down Amazon Stock and the Nasdaq, CNN (Apr. 3, 2018, 4:48 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/03/news/companies/amazon-stock/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/5GCS-RM2X]; Donald Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 23, 
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telecommunications—specifically calling out the completed merger between 
Comcast and NBC Universal and the now-completed merger between AT&T 
and Time Warner—for threatening to “destroy democracy.”110 His former 
chief strategist and right-wing icon, Steve Bannon, called for public utility 
regulation of tech platforms like Facebook and Google.111 Former Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions called for remedying the perceived liberal bias of these 
same tech platforms.112 
Others on the right have sounded similar fears about corporate power. 
Senator Ted Cruz, who has been a major recipient of campaign contributions 
 
2018, 6:35 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1021388295618682881 
[https://perma.cc/9C2J-V5UX] (“In my opinion the Washington Post is nothing more than an 
expensive (the paper loses a fortune) lobbyist for Amazon. Is it used as protection against antitrust 
claims which many feel should be brought?”); Trump Speaks in Pennsylvania; Examining 
Proposed Actions in First 100 Days of Trump Administration, CNN (Oct. 22, 2016, 12:00 
PM), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1610/22/cnr.03.html [https://perma.cc/QK48-
7RJM] (“They are trying desperately to suppress my vote and the voice of the American people 
as an example of the power structure I’m fighting, AT&T is buying Time Warner and thus CNN. 
A deal we will not approve in my administration because it's too much concentration of power in 
the hands of too few. Likewise, Amazon, which through its ownership controls ‘The Washington 
Post’ . . . . Additionally, Comcast purchase of NBC concentrates far too much power in one 
massive entity that is trying to tell the voters what to think and what to do. Deals like this destroy 
democracy. We’ll look at breaking that deal up and other deals like that. This should never, ever 
have been approved in the first place.”). 
110. Emily Stephenson, Trump Vows To Weaken U.S. Media ‘Power Structure’ if Elected, 
REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2016, 10:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-election/trump-vows-
to-weaken-u-s-media-power-structure-if-elected-idUSL1N1CS08H [https://perma.cc/BXG2-
4K7X] (“And he added a new threat to his repeated criticisms of U.S. media companies, which 
he says cover his campaign unfairly to help Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. ‘They’re trying 
desperately to suppress my vote and the voice of the American people,’ he told supporters in his 
speech. ‘As an example of the power structure I’m fighting, AT&T is buying Time Warner and 
thus CNN, a deal we will not approve in my administration because it’s too much concentration 
of power in the hands of too few,’ Trump said. He also said he would look at ‘breaking’ up 
Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Universal in 2013. ‘Deals like this destroy democracy,’ he said.”). 
111. Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants To Do to Google, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/steve-bannon-google-
facebook/535473/ [https://perma.cc/3GQ2-7NAM] (“Bannon’s endorsement of stronger 
antitrust enforcement (not to mention a higher top marginal tax rate) could very well be the 
advisor trying to signal that he is still different from Trump.”). 
112. Kim Hart, Why Jeff Sessions Scares Tech Companies, AXIOS (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.axios.com/why-jeff-sessions-scares-tech-companies-1513300442-a1e15f14-74c5-
4e6e-8419-c6042741a3f2.html [https://perma.cc/8263-KL2U] (“Sessions has gone after the tech 
industry for hiring high-skilled foreign workers and resisting law enforcement surveillance 
requests. Pile on Donald Trump's populist disdain for big companies and suspicion of some 
dominant tech platforms, and antitrust experts also say Silicon Valley has reason to be worried.”). 
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from large corporations,113 has endorsed using the antitrust laws against the 
power of tech platforms. 114  Senator (and former Representative) Marsha 
Blackburn has criticized platforms like Google and YouTube for failing to 
practice viewpoint neutrality and called them out for apparent bias against 
individuals and organizations expressing conservative opinions. 115 
 
113. Greg Ferenstein, The Silicon Valley Libertarians Putting Serious Money Behind Ted 
Cruz, BREITBART (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2015/03/25/the-silicon-
valley-libertarians-putting-serious-money-behind-ted-cruz/ [https://perma.cc/NRV7-CNM6] 
(“Paypal co-founder, Facebook investor, and self-styled libertarian Peter Thiel gave roughly 
$10,000 to Ted Cruz’s senate bid back in 2011. However, it’s his indirect contributions that really 
hit the mark. Thiel has shelled out an estimated $2M to an arm of the libertarian political action 
group, Club for Growth.”) (“Fully 58 percent ($10M) of his individual contributions are from 
large check writers, and another $1.6M came from political action committees.”) (“Sometimes 
propping up effective institutions means breaking the old ones down. Cruz, more than most 
politicians, represents a disruptive force. Disruption tends to be what Silicon Valley libertarians 
like. And, we should expect more of Ted Cruz-like contrarian politics as these technologists 
become more powerful.”). 
 114. Robert Kraychik, Exclusive—Ted Cruz: Use Antitrust Laws To Break ‘Massive Power’ 
of Tech Lords To ‘Subvert Our Democratic Process,’ BREITBART (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.breitbart.com/radio/2018/04/25/exclusive-ted-cruz-use-antitrust-laws-to-break-
massive-power-of-tech-lords-to-subvert-our-democratic-process/ [https://perma.cc/7NVS-
D7XG] (“‘I think, number one, the growing power of tech to censor speech is a profound threat. 
We’re seeing now some two-thirds of Americans are getting their news through social media, and 
these tech companies are hard-left. They are partisan Democrats, and what we’re seeing is they’re 
amplifying the views they agree with, those of liberal Democrats, and they are suppressing the 
views of conservatives. They are blocking conservatives.’”) (“‘The scope of the power is truly 
unprecedented. You think back to the heights of yellow journalism, when publisher William 
Randolph Hearst controlled much of media and in fact got America into the Spanish-American 
War. These tech companies have power William Randolph Hearst could never have imagined. 
The ability, if there’s a view they dislike, simply to silence it so that if you put a post out there, if 
you put a tweet out there, it simply goes into the void, into oblivion, and no one sees it. Likewise, 
they have the ability, if there are views they want to promote, to just have everything on your feed 
be the views they want to promote. That is invidious. It is invisible, and it is profoundly 
dangerous.’”) (“‘A second remedy is considering using anti-trust laws. By any measure, Facebook 
is larger and more powerful than Standard Oil was the antitrust laws broke it up. It’s larger and 
more power than AT&T was when antitrust laws broke it up and given that, I think we need to 
have serious consideration about the massive power we’re seeing of these tech companies to 
subvert our democratic process.’”). 
 115. Rep. Marsha Blackburn, Opinion, It’s Time To Remind Silicon Valley that No One Is 
‘Too Big To Regulate,’ FOX NEWS (June 19, 2018), 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/06/19/rep-marsha-blackburn-its-time-to-remind-silicon-
valley-that-no-one-is-too-big-to-regulate.html [https://perma.cc/8PH9-CKJ2] (“Many 
Tennesseans recalled the incident where I was subjected to censorship on Twitter. For the first 
time, they finally had an opportunity to speak up once there was an opportunity to hold a tech 
company accountable for their actions. Big Tech has gone from silencing us by blocking and 
censoring our content; to telling others what to think of us. We are left defenseless once they step 
into our shoes and speak for us . . . . [M]y Tennessee constituents have expressed concern over 
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Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) expressed similar concerns and insinuated 
that stronger governmental measures should be applied to curb the power of 
giant social media companies.116 Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO) previously 
served as Missouri’s attorney general and, during his tenure, opened an 
antitrust investigation into Google.117 
Some conservative media outlets have in recent years been vocal critics of 
corporate power. Breitbart, the hard-right news outlet formerly run by Steve 
Bannon, has championed antitrust enforcement against large corporations.118 
 
having their Christian movie trailers taken off YouTube, or their Facebook accounts being 
disabled, or their posts on Twitter being censored. As I said, I had a personal experience with the 
latter this last fall, and it was deeply troubling. I understand how these people felt. It started with 
confusion and ended with outrage. If these companies truly believe in a free and open internet, 
they should allow an honest and open public discussion – even when that means views they 
disagree with in ‘flyover country’ are highlighted . . . . What is the value of platforms that care 
more about inserting their biases than in providing a neutral place for people to discuss their ideas? 
This doesn’t just apply to the words we choose to use to express ourselves, but also the way in 
which they classify us before the public. Recently, House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy 
brought to our attention the fact that the California Republican Party was deemed a ‘Nazi’ 
organization on the front page of Google’s search results . . . . If Google is unfairly using their 
competitive advantage to stifle their competitors hopes of attracting new customers, it may be 
appropriate for regulators to take a closer look at this practice.”). 
116. Sean Moran, Exclusive—Jim Jordan: Social Media Giants ‘Cannot Say They’re an 
Open Platform and Restrict Free Speech, BREITBART (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.breitbart.com/radio/2018/08/03/exclusive-jim-jordan-social-media-giants-cannot-
say-theyre-an-open-platform-and-restrict-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/8HCN-8XRV] (“They 
cannot say that they’re an open platform and then restrict certain kinds of speech. If you are an 
open platform, you’re an open platform, if not then you’re a newspaper, and you’re subject to 
different rules and regulations and different guidelines . . . you have to pick which one you 
are . . . . If they are going to continue to do this, we are going to do a different approach to this 
sort of organization.”). 
117. Joshua Brustein, This Peter Thiel-Backed Senate Candidate Has It in for Google, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
03-08/josh-hawley-s-missouri-senate-bid-could-be-a-problem-for-google 
[https://perma.cc/7VBL-ECBF] (“In November [of 2017], Hawley subpoenaed Alphabet 
as part of an investigation into its possible violations of Missouri antitrust and consumer 
protection law.”). 
118. E.g., Fred Campbell, Campbell: Trump Should Break Up Google’s Media Monopoly, 
BREITBART (June 21, 2017) https://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/06/21/campbell-
trump-break-googles-media-monopoly/ [https://perma.cc/Q79U-N84Q]; Amanda House, Watch 
Live Breitbart News Town Hall—‘Masters of the Universe’: Big Tech vs. Free Speech and 
Privacy, BREITBART (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.breitbart.com/tech/2018/04/05/watch-live-
breitbart-news-town-hall-masters-of-the-universe-big-tech-vs-free-speech-and-privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/3MNR-98FD] (“‘Big tech is the biggest threat to free speech at this moment in 
time, and there is no fiercer advocate for the first amendment than Breitbart News,’ said Alex 
Marlow, editor-in-chief of Breitbart. ‘Never has so much power been concentrated in the hands 
of so few people, and Silicon Valley elites have, thus far, been able to operate with virtually zero 
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The American Conservative, a nativist right outlet that supports economic 
populism, has become a consistent critic of corporate power and supporter of 
renewed antitrust enforcement.119 Tucker Carlson, a commentator on Fox 
News, has endorsed public checks on Facebook and Google.120 
 
transparency. The Masters of the Universe are unfathomably influential, secretive, and they are 
surveilling all of us right now, stockpiling our data for their own purposes. It’s time we broaden 
the discussion.’ . . . Topics of discussion will include anti-consumer practices by big Internet 
monopolies like Google and Facebook—and the effects of these practices on free speech, 
consumer privacy, and competition.”). 
119. See, e.g., Daniel Kishi, Against Bigness? Begin by Breaking Up Big Tech, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE (Nov. 28, 2018, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/against-bigness-begin-by-breaking-up-big-
tech/ [https://perma.cc/TD47-RBLZ]; Daniel Kishi, Time for a Conservative Anti-Monopoly 
Movement, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 19, 2017, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/amazon-facebook-google-conservative-anti-
monopoly-movement/ [https://perma.cc/QK54-LK4S]; William A. Nitze, The Tech Giants Must 
Be Stopped, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Apr. 16, 2018, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-tech-giants-must-be-stopped/ 
[https://perma.cc/6TKS-XXNS]. 
120. Konzerva, Tucker Carlson Tonight—Break Up Big Tech?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wL7UJMSApCw [7R8M-RBUT]; Free Press News, Tucker 
Carlson—Tech Tyranny—Disturbing Political Behavior by Video Monopoly, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=22bnikzHrtQ [https://perma.cc/P8T2-XEVZ]; Fox 
News, Tucker: Google Must Be Regulated, YOUTUBE (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VyGfOgxii8Q [https://perma.cc/35P5-S9F8] (“Google is the 
most powerful company in the history of the world. It is the portal through which the bulk of our 
information flows. That means if Google isn’t on the level, neither is our understanding of the 
world. To an unprecedented extent, Google controls reality. Google has already shown a 
willingness to distort reality for ideological ends. Until they were sued for it in 2008, Google 
refused to allow anti-abortion advertisements on its platforms, even though they freely allowed 
pro-abortion ones. On the flip side, Google often blacklists certain sites from hosting ads which 
denies them revenue. Recently, Google-owned YouTube has instituted procedures to cut off 
revenue from so-called offensive content. What’s offensive? Who decides? Well, it’s an opaque 
process controlled by employees of the company . . . no surprise, the offensive label is routinely 
applied to right-of-center content creators that they don’t like. Google has also appointed itself 
the online sheriff of ‘fake news’ changing its search algorithm so that what it calls offensive or 
misleading news doesn’t even show up in searches. You will never know it existed. It is now 
obvious that Google cannot be trusted to do any of this. Why should a company that shuts down 
free speech for political reasons have the power to dictate what the world knows and thinks? Well, 
of course, it shouldn’t have that power. Google’s long-time motto was ‘don’t be evil.’ Now they 
use ‘do the right thing.’ We should have seen this coming. Those are super-villain slogans if there 
was ever such a thing. None of this can continue. In Europe, google has already been hit with a 
nearly $3 billion fine for violating antitrust law, Congress here, and the Trump administration, 
should go further than that. Since it has the power to censor the internet, Google should be treated 
like the public utility that it is to make sure that it doesn’t further distort the free flow of 
information to the rest of us. That needs to happen immediately. Too bad it has come to this. A 
lot of us trusted Google not to be evil. Silly us.”). 
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Conservative talk radio icon Rush Limbaugh described what he saw as a 
pernicious aspect to corporate ownership of media.121 He stated that large, 
non-media corporations or their CEOs, for example Jeff Bezos purchasing 
The Washington Post, acquire media to shape policy and thereby increase 
their power. 122  Even anti-government conspiracy theorist Alex Jones has 
called on the Trump administration to break up big technology companies 
because the supposedly left-leaning Silicon Valley titans are using their 
massive power to stifle conservative viewpoints.123 
With rising awareness of, and opposition to, corporate power, an anti-
merger law that directly targeted corporate size could attract significant 
popular and political support. Senator Klobuchar’s bill has already introduced 
size-based limits on consolidation into the political debate.124 Many liberals 
and progressives appear ready to embrace this idea.125 On the right, support 
for such a possibility is much less certain.126 Yet, a growing tide of criticism 
from conservative figures suggests at least one faction on the right may be 
open to preventing corporate growth through extremely large mergers and 
acquisitions.127 
 
 121. Rush Limbaugh, Don’t Ignore the Bezos-Trump Feud, RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW (May 
16, 2017), https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2017/05/16/dont-ignore-the-bezos-trump-feud/ 
[https://perma.cc/6A6W-TLH]. 
122. Id. (“So here’s Bezos owning the Washington Post, which gives him total control (if he 
wants to exercise it) of the editorial content of the paper. That’s better than any lobbying firm he 
could have ever bought into or hired. And with the threat here that Trump might pursue him on 
antitrust, I think there’s a whole dynamic here going on that may be a little bit beneath the 
surface.”)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
123. Andrew Blake, Infowars’ Alex Jones Accuses Twitter of Manipulating Midterms by 
Banning His Account, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/sep/7/alex-jones-accuses-twitter-of-
manipulating-midterm/ [https://perma.cc/AFP9-RH6F] (“‘They are clearly ahead of the midterms 
trying to manipulate the election,’ Mr. Jones said. ‘This violates federal election laws, it violates 
[the Sherman Antitrust Act], it just violates everything that’s near and dear to this country.’”). 
 124. See Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2017, S. 1812, 115th 
Cong. (2017). 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 16–18; see also In Effort to Lower Costs for 
Consumers, Help Even Playing Field for Business, and Encourage Innovation—Klobuchar, 
Senators Introduce Legislation to Promote Competition, U.S. SENATOR AMY KLOBUCHAR (Sept. 
14, 2017), https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?ID=FB9C644A-
2F7B-4FB1-9003-0E0C667E1027 [https://perma.cc/GMZ7-JQZH]. 
126. Jonathan Tepper, The Conservative Case for Antitrust, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Jan. 28, 
2019, 12:01 AM), theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-conservative-case-for-antitrust-
jonathan-tepper/ [https://perma.cc/Y6XF-ZX7P]. 
 127. See, e.g., id. 
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IV. THE WEAK CASE FOR LARGE CORPORATE MERGERS128 
While critics are likely to assert that our proposal would lead to the loss of 
merger-related efficiencies, this claim should be treated with extreme 
skepticism. Although the implicit premise of contemporary merger policy is 
that merger among firms is usually a desirable event, the evidence suggests 
that mergers among substantial firms on the whole do not result in positive 
outcomes over time, let alone significant efficiencies that can be proven in 
advance of the merger. Moreover, as Judge Posner recently noted, mergers 
that result in significant efficiencies are rare: “I wish someone would give me 
some examples of mergers that have improved efficiency. There must be 
some.” 129  Conglomerate mergers, in particular, are unlikely to generate 
efficiencies and, if anything, may generate inefficiencies as different and 
unrelated businesses are brought under a single firm’s management.130 Thus, 
the potential social costs of a stricter policy against large conglomerate 
mergers are small. 
A. Empirical Work on Mergers Shows Few Efficiency Gains 
Overall the best evidence suggests that, on average, mergers are probably 
roughly neutral in terms of their overall effects on efficiency, costs, and 
productivity.131 Moreover, many of the efficiencies that are generated by 
 
128. This section of this Article is adapted and condensed from material in contained in 
Carstensen & Lande, supra note 4, at 822–36. 
129. Scott Hemphill, Philadelphia National Bank at 50: An Interview with Judge Richard 
Posner, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 205, 216 (2015). 
130. See, e.g., Dennis C. Mueller, Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. ECON. & STATS. 259, 
261–63 (1985). 
131. The authors are grateful to Professors Dennis Carlton and Melissa Schilling for advice 
concerning this topic. None of the interpretations of these studies, however, should necessarily be 
attributed to Professors Carlton or Schilling. 
Studies, some of which evaluate hundreds of mergers, showing overall mixed or essentially 
neutral overall results from mergers, depending upon a large number of variables, include: K.P. 
Ramaswamy & James F. Waegelein, Firm Financial Performance Following Mergers, 20 REV. 
QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING 115 (2003); Raghavendra Rau & Theo Vermaelen, 
Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 223 
(1998); Jarayr Haleblian & Sydney Finkelstein, The Influence of Organizational Acquisition 
Experience on Acquisition Performance: A Behavioral Learning Perspective, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
29 (1999); Laurence Capron, The Long-Term Performance of Horizontal Acquisitions, 20 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 987 (1999); James D. Parrino & Robert S Harris, Takeovers, Management 
Replacement, and Post-Acquisition Operating Performance: Some Evidence from the 1980s, 11 
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. (2005); Michael L. McDonald, James D. Westphal & Melissa E. Graebner, 
What Do They Know? The Effects of Outside Director Acquisition Experience on Firm 
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mergers are likely to result from the more than ninety-nine percent of mergers 
that would be of no interest to enforcers if our proposal were enacted because 
they involve firms smaller than $10 billion in assets. A modest number of 
studies show, on average, small efficiency gains from mergers. 132  By 
 
Acquisition Performance, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (2008). See also Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin 
R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency, NBER Working 
Paper No. 22750, issued in October 2016, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22750, at 1 
[https://perma.cc/6FU8-XC6L] (“We use newly-developed techniques to separately estimate 
productivity and markups across a wide range of industries using detailed plant-level data. 
Employing a difference-in-differences framework, we find that M&As are associated with 
increases in average markups, but find little evidence for effects on plant level productivity. We 
also examine whether M&As increase efficiency through reallocation of production to more 
efficient plants or through reductions in administrative operations, but again find little evidence 
for these channels, on average. The results are robust to a range of approaches to address the 
endogeneity of firms’ merger decisions.”); Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1154 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 
2007) (summarizing event study evidence showing that acquiring firms do not benefit from 
mergers on average). 
132. For a recent survey see Dennis Carlton, Eugene Fama and Industrial Organization, THE 
FAMA PORTFOLIO (John Cochrane, Tobias Moskowitz, ed.) (forthcoming). A slightly revised 
version appears as “How Eugene F. Fama has left his mark on industrial organization,” in the 
CHICAGO BOOTH REVIEW, (May 10, 2017). “Mergers don’t seem to create market power but do 
seem to create efficiencies. There is an overall gain in value to the merged firm somewhere in the 
range of 0–10% (e.g., Andrade et al. [2001] report a 2% gain) above the value of the separate 
firms’ values, and that gain seems unrelated to market power . . . [so] any significant toughening 
of standards runs the risk of deterring efficiency-enhancing mergers.” Id. at 2. A recent study 
showing overall positive effects from mergers is: Keith D. Brouthers, Paul van Hastenburg & 
Joran van den Ven, If Most Mergers Fail Why Are They So Popular?, 31 LONG RANGE PLANNING 
347 (1998) (“These previous studies have consistently shown that acquiring firms do not benefit 
from mergers. . . . This study suggests that researchers have been using incorrect measures of 
merger performance, which accounts for their negative findings. The authors present a new 
methodology for measuring merger performance. . . . The results of applying this new 
methodology to a small sample of Dutch mergers indicate that mergers are extremely 
successful.”); see also Steven N. Kaplan, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Financial Economics 
Perspective, Testimony before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/AMC/commission_hearings/PDF/kaplan_statement.pdf 
(“Although the evidence is not uniform, on balance I would conclude that acquisitions create 
economic value. I rely on the announcement returns as the critical evidence. They have been 
reliably positive over the last 30 years, particularly for acquisitions that are cash financed. 
Acquisitions using stock are value neutral, but likely include a negative information component 
about the stand-alone firms. It is clear that shareholders of targets gain, while shareholders of 
acquirers experience mixed results. The accounting-based studies are more mixed, but are subject 
to more noise.”). For an older survey see Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern 
Industrial Organization (4th ed. 2004) (“In summary, stock market evidence supports the view 
that merger activity improves efficiency and improves value. . . . Additional research on profits 
subsequent to consolidation, not on stock price, is needed to confirm these efficiency gains. 
Without such research, some may argue that mergers and takeovers create illusory stock market 
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contrast, a very large and reputable body of findings show that, generally and 
overall, mergers lead to losses of productive efficiencies, 133  including 
relatively large losses in some cases.134 
 
value that represents either the unjustified transfer of wealth from those dependent on the acquired 
firm. . . . to its shareholders, or valuation errors by the stock market.”) (also citing the above 
referenced 2001 Andrade & Stafford study). 
133. Studies showing overall results from mergers that are slightly negative include David 
R. King, Dan R. Dalton, Catherine M. Daily & Jeffrey G. Covin, Meta-Analyses of 
Post-Acquisition Performance: Indications of Unidentified Moderators, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 
(2004) (“We find robust results indicating that, on average and across the most commonly studied 
variables, acquiring firms’ performance does not positively change as a function of their 
acquisition activity, and is negatively affected to a modest extent.”); Aloke Ghosh, Does 
Operating Performance Really Improve Following Corporate Acquisitions?, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 151 
(2001) (“Previous research indicates that operating performance improves following corporate 
acquisitions relative to industry-median firms. Such performance results are likely to be biased 
because acquiring firms undertake acquisitions following a period of superior performance and 
they are generally larger than industry-median firms. Using firms matched on performance and 
size as a benchmark, I find no evidence that operating performance improves following 
acquisitions.”); Vassilis M. Papadakis & Ioannis C. Thanos, Measuring the Performance of 
Acquisitions: An Empirical Investigation Using Multiple Criteria, 21 BRITISH J. MGMT. 859 
(2010) (“Overall, results from the three measures indicate failure rates from 50% to 60%.”); 
Patricia M. Danzon, Andrew Epstein & Sean Nicholson, Mergers and Acquisitions in the 
Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industries, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. (2007) 
(“Controlling for merger propensity, large firms that merged experienced a similar change in 
enterprise value, sales, employees, and R&D, and had slower growth in operating profit, 
compared with similar firms that did not merge.”). 
134. Studies that show overall effects from mergers that are clearly negative on average 
include Paul Andre, Maher Kooli & Jean-Francois L’Her, The Long-Run Performance of Mergers 
and Acquisitions: Evidence from the Canadian Stock Market, 33 FIN. MGMT. 27 (2004) (a study 
of 267 Canadian acquisitions shows that “acquirers significantly underperform over the three-
year post-event period.”); Anup Agrawal, Jeffrey F. Jaffe & Gershon N. Mandelker, The Post-
Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly, 47 J. FIN. 1605 
(1992) (“[U]sing a nearly exhaustive sample of mergers between NYSE acquirers and 
NYSE/AMEX targets. We find that stockholders of acquiring firms suffer a statistically 
significant loss of about 10% over the five-year post-merger period, a result robust to various 
specifications.”); Andrew P. Dickerson, Heather D. Gibson & Euclid Tsakalotos, The Impact of 
Acquisitions on Company Performance: Evidence From a Large Panel of UK Firms, 49 OXFORD 
ECON. PAPERS 344 (1997) (“This paper investigates the impact of acquisitions on company 
performance using a large panel of UK-quoted companies observed over a long time period. The 
results indicate that acquisitions have a detrimental impact on company performance and that 
company growth through acquisition yields a lower rate of return than growth through internal 
investment.”); David J. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers, 7 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 101 (1989) (“Following merger, the profitability of acquired entities declined 
except among pooling-of-interests merger partners of roughly equal pre-merger size.”); Christian 
Tuch & Noel O’Sullivan, The Impact of Acquisitions on Form Performance: A Review of the 
Evidence, 9 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 141 (2007) (“(“The evidence suggests that, in the short run, 
acquisitions have at best an insignificant impact on shareholder wealth. Long-run performance 
analysis reveals overwhelmingly negative returns, while the evidence using accounting 
performance measures is mixed.”). 
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Other empirical work is consistent with the rejection of any general 
expectation that major horizontal mergers are likely to result in increased 
productive efficiency. Professors Scherer and Ravenscraft found that most 
mergers have resulted in inefficiency.135 More recent studies,136 including 
studies of banking, insurance, and airlines, confirm this result.137 Professor 
Kwoka found that the numerous post-merger studies he reviewed (every 
respectable impact evaluation analysis he could find) reported little evidence 
of efficiency gains.138 Thus the earlier quoted conclusion by Judge Posner (“I 
wish someone would give me some examples of mergers that have improved 
efficiency. There must be some.”139) should come as no surprise. 
Conglomerate mergers are especially unlikely to generate productive 
efficiencies. History is very informative here. The conglomerate merger wave 
that happened in the 1960s and 1970s typically did not yield the promised 
managerial efficiencies.140 The conglomerate entrepreneurs often proved to 
be masters of financial wizardry, not competent managers. 141  And by 
bringing disparate business lines under common management, conglomerate 
mergers demanded too much of even capable managers and produced poorly 
 
135. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY 202–03 (1987). Like most of these studies, this study looked at mergers generally and 
did not limit its focus to the large mergers of concern to antitrust. 
136. See, e.g., Aloke Ghosh, Does Operating Performance Really Improve Following 
Corporate Acquisitions?, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 151, 151 (2001) (finding “no evidence that operating 
performance improves following acquisitions”). 
137. J. David Cummins, Sharon Tennyson & Mary A. Weiss, Consolidation and Efficiency 
in the US Life Insurance Industry, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 325, 327 (1999) (“[L]arger [life 
insurance] firms generally are found to exhibit decreasing returns to sale.”); Todd T. Milbourn, 
Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Megamergers and Expanding Scope: Theories of Bank 
Size and Activity Diversity, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 195, 197-98 (1999) (“[Banking provides] little 
or no improvement in cost efficiency . . . there is also a lack of empirical evidence that expansion 
of scope in banking has been beneficial.”); Diana L. Moss, Delivering the Benefits? Efficiencies 
and Airline Mergers, AM. ANTITRUST INST. (2013), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2547673. 
138. See KWOKA, supra note 8. 
139. Hemphill, supra note 129. 
140. Dennis C. Mueller, The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers: A Survey of the Empirical 
Evidence, 1 J. BANKING. & FIN. 315, 344 (1977). 
141. See LOUIS HYMAN, TEMP: HOW AMERICAN WORK, AMERICAN BUSINESS, AND THE 
AMERICAN DREAM BECAME TEMPORARY 149–54 (2018) (tracing the rise and fall of James Ling 
and the conglomerate LTV). Conglomerate firms elevated the role of executives with a finance 
background. In contrast to CEOs with sales and marketing or production experience who brought 
expertise in a particular market or industry, finance-oriented CEOs could claim they had the 
ability to evaluate and compare unrelated businesses by looking at each line of business as an 
abstracted set of cash flows. NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 160 (2002). 
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run, bloated organizations.142 A leading business publication concluded that 
these conglomerates “became far too diverse for any corporate leader to 
embrace. . . . [and] [l]ayer upon layer of management jobs were added to the 
structure.”143 These mergers had such poor results that many of them were 
undone in the 1980s. The leading conglomerates, such as ITT and Gulf & 
Western, sold off many businesses, and companies like Texaco and Mobil 
returned to their core businesses and divested unrelated ones, including ESPN 
and Montgomery Ward, respectively. 144  The then-dean of Northwestern 
University’s Kellogg School of Management offered a grim assessment of 
the conglomerate phenomenon, “The thinking used to be that once a 
conglomerate was put together, the whole was more valuable than its 
parts . . . . Now the parts seem more valuable than the whole.”145 
Indeed, many of the gains to the merging parties likely to be proclaimed 
as “efficiency” benefits on closer analysis involve transferring costs to third 
parties. 146  For example, when two large retailers combine and eliminate 
outlets, this imposes greater travel burdens on customers. The merged parties 
may have lower costs, but a broader economic calculus could show that the 
total social costs of the merger are overall neutral or even negative. 147 
Another false economy comes from exploiting enhanced buyer power to 
drive down the price of inputs. Such buyer power can offset an upstream 
oligopoly’s seller power, but it is often used to lower prices to powerless 
suppliers. This is no more an efficiency than the gains to a monopolist from 
raising prices to purchasers.148 
In sum, most studies have found that, on the whole, mergers do not on 
average increase net corporate efficiency. As Professor Schilling concluded, 
“Overall, the evidence for mergers having negligible or negative effects on 
value appears to outweigh the evidence for clearly positive or mixed effects 
 
 142. FLIGSTEIN, supra note 141 at 325–26. 
143. Managers Who Are No Longer Entrepreneurs, BUS. WEEK, June 30, 1980, at 74, 81. 
144. Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The “New Learning” and the Euthanasia of 
Antitrust, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1549–50 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145. Id. at 1550 (citing A Growing Disillusion with Conglomerates, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 
1985). 
146. This is ironic because a primary goal of the antitrust laws is to prevent wealth transfers 
from purchasers to firms with market power. See Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 28, at 151. 
147. See CRAIG LAMBERT, SHADOW WORK: THE UNPAID, UNSEEN JOBS THAT FILL YOUR DAY 
(2015) (describing the many tasks that have devolved onto individuals which were once done for 
them). 
148. See Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor 
Progress on an Important Issue, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 775 (2012). See generally PETER C. 
CARSTENSEN, COMPETITION POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF BUYER POWER: A GLOBAL ISSUE 
(2017). 
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on value.”149 In light of this empirical research, Congress can reasonably 
conclude that if it were to pass the legislation this Article advocates, it would 
not significantly impair the attainment of productive efficiencies and could 
indeed channel corporate strategy away from unproductive merger activity 
and toward beneficial investment in new products and facilities. 
B. Shareholders of the Resulting Firm Often Suffer Significant Losses 
A final basis for rejecting any general claims that mergers are generally 
desirable is that many empirical examinations of the results for shareholders 
show that on average the buyer and its investors suffer losses, not gains. In 
1992, a major study, covering more than thirty years of mergers among 
publicly traded companies, reported that the surviving firm on average lost 
about ten percent of its value over a period of five years.150 Another group of 
researchers reported that the acquired businesses tended to suffer reduced 
profitability and loss of market position.151  In 2012 alone, publicly held 
companies wrote off $51 billion dollars because of bad mergers.152  
 
149. Melissa A. Schilling, Potential Sources of Value from Mergers and Their Indicators, 63 
ANTITRUST BULL. 183, 190 (2018) (“A considerable body of research has attempted to assess 
whether, on average, mergers create or destroy shareholder value. Studies have used a wide range 
of methodological approaches (e.g., event studies, large panel analyses, case studies), samples 
(e.g., mergers in particular industries, mergers where both the acquirer and target are US publicly 
held firms, mergers that vary in the share that is taken by the acquirer), and performance measures 
(e.g., stock price reactions, long-run cumulative abnormal returns, accounting performance, 
productivity, patenting outcomes). It should be clear that there are large number of parameters 
that may vary in the construction of a research design to study the performance of mergers, and, 
not surprisingly, the research has fallen well short of a consensus.”). 
150. Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, supra note 134, at 1605–06. 
151. Dennis C. Mueller & Mark L. Sirower, The Causes of Mergers: Tests Based on the 
Gains To Acquiring Firms’ Shareholders and the Size of Premia, 24 MANAGERIAL & DECISION 
ECON. 373, 374 (2003) (citing five studies “that suggest that acquisitions significantly impair the 
long-term profitability or market shares of the acquired businesses”). That study also found that 
there was a strong tendency to overpay for acquisitions. Id. at 380, 388 (“[S]everal of our findings 
actually imply that mergers destroy more of the value of the bidding firms than is paid as premium 
to the target.”). 
152. Emily Chasan & Maxwell Murphy, Companies Get More Wiggle Room on Soured 
Deals, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2013, 8:15 PM), 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304868404579191940788875848 (reporting a study 
by Duff & Phelps); see also Steven Lipin & Nikhil Deogun, Big Mergers of the ‘90s Prove 
Disappointing to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2000, 2:40 AM), 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB972860303890013995 (reporting that Salomon Smith Barney’s 
analysis of major mergers showed that the acquirers “on average underperformed” measured by 
both the S&P 500 stock index and their peer group); Bhushan Bahree, Oil Mergers Leave 
Investors Gushing, but Do the Combinations Really Work?, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 1999, 1:46 
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Other research is consistent with these findings. A comparison of 
successful buyers to the losing bidder in a corporate buyout found that the 
buyers had worse results over time than the unsuccessful bidders.153 In 2010 
McKinsey reported: “Anyone who has researched merger success rates 
knows that roughly 70% of mergers fail.” 154  An article in the Harvard 
Business Review observed that “study after study puts the failure rate of 
mergers and acquisitions somewhere between 70% and 90%.”155 The basic 
point being that buyers have a tendency to overpay and not to realize the gains 
that they claimed to expect. Even the co-author of a leading article claiming 
acquisitions resulted in significant premiums for the buyer subsequently 
recanted and conceded that there were “significant negative returns . . . 
following a merger.”156 
Thus, measured by stock market results most large mergers are not in fact 
very helpful to the development of economic efficiency, innovation, or other 
consequences that are desirable from the perspective of the public interest. It 
follows that stronger anti-merger legislation does not create a significant risk 
of substantial loss of desirable economic outcomes. 
Mergers’ “disappointing results are . . . consistent with the repeated 
observation that many motivations for merger are largely disconnected from 
achieving economic efficiency despite what the promoters may assert in 
 
AM), www.wsj.com/articles/SB932592913980475039 (“Megamergers often flop, and oil 
mergers especially are prone to failure.”). 
153. Ulrike Malmendier, Enrico Moretti & Florian S. Peters, Winning by Losing: Evidence 
on the Long-Run Effects of Mergers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18024, 
2012), www.nber.org/papers/w18024. 
154. MCKINSEY & CO., PERSPECTIVES ON MERGER INTEGRATION 11 (2010) (copy on file with 
author). 
155. Clayton M. Christensen, Richard Alton, Curtis Rising & Andrew Waldeck, The Big 
Idea: The New M&A Playbook, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 3. 
156. Richard S. Ruback, Comment, on Means of Payment in Takeovers: Results for the 
United Kingdom and the United States, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
260, 262 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (commenting on a study covering most American mergers 
from 1955 to 1985 where the shareholders in the successful buyer suffered an average seventeen 
percent decline in share value in the two years following the merger). Ruback was Michael C. 
Jensen’s co-author in Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate 
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983), which is one of the most frequently 
cited statements of the thesis that changes in corporate control are efficiency enhancing and 
produce positive gains for both selling shareholders and shareholders in the buyer. 
52:0075] CONGLOMERATE MERGER LEGISLATION 109 
 
 
securities filings and press briefings.”157 A “publicly held corporation faces 
very substantial agency problems.”158  
The shareholders are largely powerless when ownership is widely 
dispersed. The board of directors, the agent of the shareholders, is 
usually under the control of management, which in turn can shape 
both buying and selling decisions to serve its strategic interests. 
Moreover, third parties, takeover funds, legal and financial advisers, 
can and do reap benefits from promoting such transactions even 
when the result for the enterprise is negative. Hence, many major 
mergers arise from motivations unrelated to increased efficiency.159 
For all these reasons the purchase and sale of large corporations does not 
consistently advance desirable economic results. These results should 
encourage Congress to seriously consider new anti-merger legislation. 
V. OUR PROPOSAL WOULD NOT IMPAIR THE ATTAINMENT OF 
PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCIES 
Even though large mergers do not produce significant efficiencies on 
average, our specific proposal would be especially unlikely to reduce 
corporate economic efficiency. Companies seeking to achieve economies of 
scale and other productive efficiencies could still proceed in one of two ways. 
First, the merger could proceed so long as the acquiring company sold or 
spun off similarly sized assets. Since many or most of the mergers this 
proposal will affect will encompass a number of industries that are not 
horizontally or vertically related to one another, the acquiring company 
typically should be able to identify and spin off or sell assets in a way that 
would not diminish overall corporate efficiency. Thus, if the legislation 
contained $10 billion thresholds, the acquiring company would be permitted 
 
157. Peter C. Carstensen, The Philadelphia National Bank Presumption: Merger Analysis in 
an Unpredictable World, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 257 (2015). For one ironic evaluation, see 
Stanley Bing, Why We Love Mergers, FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2014), 
https://fortune.com/2014/12/04/why-we-love-mergers/ [https://perma.cc/HW7J-3BLK] (stating 
“a host of articles contend[s] that . . . up to 70% or 80% of . . . mergers dilute value rather than 
build it.” But the interests of bankers, lawyers, journalists and Wall Street all drive the process so 
“[w]hen all the M&As have been finished, we’ll have five big companies that do everything”). 
See also JONATHAN A. KNEE, BRUCE C. GREENWALD & AVA SEAVE, THE CURSE OF THE MOGUL: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE WORLD’S LEADING MEDIA COMPANIES (2011) (describing consistent 
over payment for media properties). 
158. Carstensen, supra note 157, at 257. This is a longstanding issue in corporate governance. 
See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1991). 
 159. Id. 
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to keep a net of $9.9 billion in assets from a merger—surely enough to attain 
almost any conceivable efficiency. 
Second, companies would still have the freedom to achieve productive 
efficiencies through internal growth. Instead of buying their way to possible 
efficiencies, they would have an incentive to invest in new facilities and 
improve their own operations. Similarly, rather than enter new markets 
through acquisitions of existing firms, companies could always enter by 
setting up and investing in a new line of business. Indeed, strong merger 
policy can, in general, divert corporate management away from mergers and 
acquisitions and toward more socially valuable pursuits. The Clayton Act 
reflects this distinction between growth through merger and growth through 
internal expansion: it restricts the former and permits the latter.160 At present, 
under the agencies’ tolerant approach to mergers, “managerial energies [are] 
devoted to sterile paper entrepreneurialism and the quick growth-through-
merger game” and “diverted from the critical task of investing in new plants, 
new products, and state-of-the-art manufacturing techniques.”161 
There is also a third possibility (albeit an option we believe to be unwise). 
Conglomerate merger legislation could include an explicit efficiencies 
defense. If Congress is determined to do this, we would strongly urge that 
any efficiencies defense be very narrow. 
Today, the conflict between Supreme Court precedent on an efficiency 
defense and existing practice under the Clayton Act is rarely acknowledged. 
In a trio of decisions in the 1960s, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected an 
efficiencies defense in merger challenges under the Clayton Act. 162 
Notwithstanding this controlling judicial precedent, the enforcement 
agencies have recognized an efficiencies defense in their Horizontal Merger 
 
160. As the Supreme Court pointed out in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, “one 
premise of an antimerger statute such as [Section 7 of the Clayton Act] is that corporate growth 
by internal expansion is socially preferable to growth by acquisition.” 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963); 
Peritz, supra note 26, at 198.  
161. Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The Proposed Emasculation of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 65 NEB. L. REV. 813, 819 (1986); see also Sandeep Vaheesan, American Prosperity 
Depends on Stopping Mega-Mergers, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2019/04/25/1556192949000/American-prosperity-depends-on-
stopping-mega-mergers/ [https://perma.cc/7SVP-A6EU]. 
162. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“Congress appreciated 
that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries 
and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.”); Phila. 
Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 371 (“We are clear . . . that a merger the effect of which ‘may be 
substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or 
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 
U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality.”). 
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Guidelines since 1982 and inspired its acceptance in the lower courts.163 
Today, in part informed by the agency’s merger guidelines, most, but not all, 
lower courts have tentatively recognized an efficiencies defense.164 As the 
next section of this Article will demonstrate, mergers should not have an 
efficiencies defense. 
If Congress believes an efficiencies defense is appropriate, we recommend 
giving the merging parties a very limited, consumer-oriented defense. We 
propose that Congress require that the merging parties be required to show, 
by “clear and convincing evidence,” efficiencies that will be “passed on to 
consumers” and that “[cannot] be achieved through” non-merger means such 
as “internal expansion” or contractual arrangements.” 165  The proposed 
defense would require detailed factual documentation and would not be 
satisfied through theoretical assertions. 
Nevertheless, as the next section will demonstrate, even a narrow 
efficiencies defense would vastly increase the complexity of the law while 
undermining its predictability and dramatically increasing the risk of 
subjective enforcement and judicial decision-making. 
VI. RULE OF LAW AND OTHER JURISPRUDENTIAL ISSUES 
Our proposed anti-conglomerate merger law would improve the 
objectivity and transparency of anti-merger enforcement. Current anti-
merger enforcement is tied to the open-ended, rule of reason style framework 
articulated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.166 The prevailing method of 
 
163. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 
(2010). 
164. Some courts have assumed an efficiencies defense while expressing deep skepticism 
about its legality and emphasizing the vitality of the Supreme Court’s merger decisions from the 
1960s. FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We note at the 
outset that we have never formally adopted the efficiencies defense. Neither has the Supreme 
Court.”); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 
790 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We remain skeptical about the efficiencies defense in general and about its 
scope in particular. It is difficult enough in § 7 cases to predict whether a merger will have future 
anticompetitive effects without also adding to the judicial balance a prediction of future 
efficiencies.”). But see ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 571 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(formally recognizing an efficiencies defense); FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 
(8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991);. 
165. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
ARCHIVES, 1, 16, 31, n.91. See Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363 (“[Mergers] must be enjoined 
in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such 
anticompetitive effects.”) (emphasis added). 
166. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 163, at §§ 4–10. 
112 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
 
merger analysis prioritizes identifying potential anticompetitive effects and 
discounts market share and concentration numbers. 167  This framework 
promotes subjective enforcement and judicial decision-making in merger 
cases. Furthermore, current merger reviews are nonpublic, opaque, and rarely 
subject to after-the-fact testing of agency decisions, prompting one notable 
antitrust lawyer to quip that merger reviews are the least transparent 
governmental process outside of intelligence gathering.168 
By contrast, our suggested legislation would incorporate social and 
political considerations into merger enforcement and also be clear and 
predictable and minimize subjectivity. The statute would contain express 
dollar limits (i.e., corporations may not merge if their assets each exceed $10 
billion). This decision rule would be as clear and objective as any antitrust 
rule can be. Especially because one of the companies would usually be 
making an offer for the stock of the other, the enforcers and the courts almost 
always would find it relatively easy to determine whether both companies 
were above the designated thresholds. While some ambiguity may exist on 
the margins of the threshold level, this ambiguity would be far less than the 
ambiguity that exists for mergers evaluated under the current interpretation 
of the Clayton Act.169 
Of course, the merging parties could try circumventing the law’s specified 
limits by, for example, dividing a $50 billion company into six parts and 
merging each of the parts into the acquiring company seriatim. To prevent 
this from happening, the law should contain a provision that would consider 
as an aggregation all the assets that had been the property of either of the 
merging firms. The law could, for example, provide that the law’s assets 
threshold applied to anything owned by the acquired company within ten 
years of the date of the acquisition.170 Under this approach a large company 
would be unable to acquire another by purchasing it in parts within a ten-year 
period. 171 
 
167. Id. For a comprehensive critique of the antitrust rule of reason see generally Maurice E. 
Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2008). 
Judge Taft famously wrote that analyzing the “reasonableness” of restraints of trade requires 
“set[ting] sail on a sea of doubt.” United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 
(6th Cir. 1898). 
168. Eisinger & Elliott, supra note 71. 
169. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019), and the 2010 AT&T 
merger which involved $1 billion in transaction costs. 
170. The period should start many years before each merger in question, and extend for years 
afterwards, to prevent the parties from attempting to circumvent it. 
171. A stricter alternative would be to prevent any company with assets exceeding $10 billion 
to acquire more than $10 billion of assets from all mergers or acquisitions combined within a 
lengthy period of time, such as ten years. 
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Our proposal promotes ease of administration and predictability because 
it would mandate a simple hard asset cap on all mergers. Its two sources of 
complexity are the elements that permit mergers and acquisitions under 
certain conditions: its “cap and spinoff option” and, especially, any 
efficiencies defense. 
The “cap-and spinoff” feature would give rise to administrative and 
transaction costs. First, the antitrust agencies would have to review proposed 
spinoffs under the Clayton Act to ensure that they do not threaten to diminish 
competition in other markets. Spinoffs carry the risk of enhancing the market 
power of the firm or firms that purchase the divested assets in one or more 
markets. Second, management would have to identify assets equal to or larger 
than those of the acquired company—plus just under $10 billion. In other 
words, it would have to identify and sell assets so large that the transaction 
would no longer violate the new law. 172  For example, suppose the law 
prevented two companies with $10 billion or more in assets from merging, 
and suppose that two $50 billion companies wanted to merge. The acquiring 
company would have to identify and then sell or spin off at least $40.1 billion 
of its overall tentative post-merger $100 billion in assets to satisfy the asset 
cap. In this way the acquiring company would be increasing its size only by 
$9.9 billion, and so would not violate the law. 
This would mean that if the legislation used relatively large (we believe 
unwisely large) $50 billion thresholds, a $100 billion company could legally 
increase its size by $49.9 billion. Accordingly, Congress should instead 
choose a relatively low threshold, such as $10 billion. This would mean that 
a $100 billion company could purchase another $100 billion company and, if 
it spun off enough assets, ultimately increase its size by $9.9 billion. 
Although by many standards this still would be an enormous merger, it would 
be below the explicit $10 billion threshold established by the law. 
Simplicity also cuts dramatically against the inclusion of an efficiencies 
defense. If Congress does include an efficiencies defense, this would 
significantly reduce predictability and increase mergers transaction costs, and 
vastly increase the discretion given to enforcers and judges.173 Some of the 
largest mergers that have been evaluated under the current enforcement 
approach have involved transaction costs approaching $1 billion 174  and 
 
172. The law could include a provision requiring the enforcers to only approve the spin offs 
or sales during their merger negotiations with the parties if the enforcers believed that the assets 
would constitute viable ongoing businesses. 
173. See, e.g., Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger 
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1654–59 (1983). 
174. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019), and the 2010 AT&T 
merger which involved $1 billion in transaction costs. 
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significant delays. One of the advantages of our proposal, that it would be 
relatively simpler to implement, would be reduced significantly by an 
efficiencies defense. This is particularly true because the evidence strongly 
supports a general skepticism toward claims of efficiencies from large 
corporate mergers, and it is extremely difficult for the enforcers and courts to 
predict in advance which mergers will result in significant efficiencies.175 
This task is especially difficult because the vast majority of mergers—
perhaps up to ninety percent—result in no significant net efficiencies, or in 
losses (as was discussed supra). “[T]hose few merges that result in 
[significant] efficiencies are almost impossible to identify reliably in 
advance.”176 
For this reason, an efficiencies defense would seriously undermine one of 
the biggest advantages of our proposal—that it would increase predictability, 
certainty, and the rule of law compared to the current way mergers are 
analyzed. Moreover, currently efficiencies from mergers must not only be 
predicted as to their existence and significance. 177  They must also “be 
balanced against any anticompetitive effects” that the merger produces.178 
Agencies and courts undertake a “cost-benefit analysis” that is more 
characteristic of legislative and regulatory policy-making than case-by-case 
adjudication.179 
 
175. Id.; see also Alan A. Fisher, Frederick I. Johnson & Robert H. Lande, Price Effects of 
Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777 (1989). 
 176. Carstensen & Lande, supra note 4, at 818. 
 177. Federal Antitrust Policy in the Health Care Marketplace: Hearing Before the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.  40 (1997) (statement of William G. Kopit). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Craig W. Conrath & Nicholas A. Widnell, Efficiency Claims in Merger Analysis: 
Hostility or Humility, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 685, 702 (1999). Justice Thurgood Marshall 
explained this important point in a decision for the Supreme Court, explaining why the courts 
should not be weighing the harms and benefits of a challenged trade restraint. He wrote: 
There have been tremendous departures from the notion of a free-enterprise 
system as it was originally conceived in this country. These departures have 
been the product of congressional action and the will of the people. If a 
decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy 
for greater competition in another portion, this too is a decision that must be 
made by Congress and not by private forces or by the courts. Private forces are 
too keenly aware of their own interests in making such decisions and courts 
are ill-equipped and ill-situated for such decisionmaking. To analyze, 
interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless data 
that would surely be brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the 
delicate judgment on the relative values to society of competitive areas of the 
economy, the judgment of the elected representatives of the people is required. 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611–12 (1972). 
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Although we believe it would be unwise, the proposed narrow efficiency 
defense would be the least harmful way to incorporate efficiencies. Our 
proffered legislation would treat significant efficiencies as an absolute 
defense—so long as the merging parties could demonstrate “by clear and 
convincing evidence” that the merger will produce significant merger-
specific efficiencies that will be passed to consumers and that these 
efficiencies cannot be achieved through non-merger alternatives such as 
internal expansion or contractual arrangements. Thus, the efficiencies would 
not have to be weighed against any anticompetitive effects of the merger. 
VII. CONCLUSION: PREVENTING THE CURSE OF BIGNESS180 
We are proposing that Congress enact legislation that would block the very 
largest corporate mergers—every merger in which both corporations have 
more than $10 billion in assets—regardless whether they are horizontal, 
vertical, or conglomerate. The legislation this article has outlined should 
significantly reduce increases in the concentration of political and other forms 
of non-economic power caused by corporate mergers. The legislation would 
recover and build upon antitrust law’s historic embrace of public concerns 
with the economic and political power of the very largest corporations. But 
this time these concerns would be directly incorporated into the text and 
substance of the antitrust laws. 
This legislation would accomplish its goals in a manner that is simple and 
administrable. It would not cause any significant decreases in economic 
efficiency. Nor would it cause any “rule of law” problems. In fact, it would 
be clearer, faster, more predictable, less expensive, and less subjective and 
discretionary than the evaluations of mergers under the current approach. 
Our proposal would only affect approximately one percent of the 
thousands of corporate mergers large enough to be reportable to the federal 
antitrust enforcers each year.181 Yet, it would restrict an important driver of 
 
180. In this Article’s and this section’s title we pay homage to Justice Brandeis, who 
believed: “[N]o monopoly in private industry in America has yet been attained by efficiency 
alone. . . . It will be found that wherever competition has been suppressed it has been due either 
to resort to ruthless processes, or by improper use of inordinate wealth and power. The attempt to 
dismember existing illegal trusts is not, therefore, an attempt to interfere in any way with the 
natural law of business. It is an endeavor to restore health by removing a cancer from the body 
industrial.” BRANDEIS, supra note 44, at 114–16. 
181. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N , HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 1 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-bureau-competition-department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-
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corporate gigantism. Mega-mergers, which are proposed on seemingly a 
weekly basis at present, would be off the table. Very large corporations would 
no longer have the option of merging, with little or no antitrust concern, and 
augmenting their existing economic and political power. Our proposal would 
certainly not cure the curse of bigness. It would, however, strike an important 
blow against it getting worse. 
  
 
rodino/p110014_fy_2017_hsr_report_final_april_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/72KT-EKCS] (“In 
fiscal year 2017, 2,052 transactions were reported under the HSR Act, representing about a 12.0 
percent increase from the 1,832 transactions reported in fiscal year 2016.”).  
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APPENDIX I: PROPOSED MODEL CONGLOMERATE MERGER LEGISLATION 
Proposed Section 7B of the Clayton Act 
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall merge, 
combine or consolidate with any other person engaged in or affecting the 
commerce of the United States, or acquire, directly or indirectly, any of the 
voting securities or assets of such other person, or acquire, directly or 
indirectly, any of the assets of such other person, if each person has assets 
exceeding $10,000,000,000. This figure should be adjusted yearly to account 
for inflation. 
2(a). It shall be an affirmative defense to an offense under Section 1 if the 
merging parties, within one year before or after the consummation of the 
transaction, shall have divested one or more viable business units, the assets 
of which are equal to or greater than the assets and revenues of the smaller 
party to the transaction; and 
2(b). The assets threshold in Section 1 of this law apply to any assets 
owned by any acquiring or acquired company at any time from 10 (ten) years 
before the announced date of the merger, to 10 (ten) years after the announced 
date of the merger. These assets shall be aggregated and compared to the 
thresholds in Section 1, and if these assets exceed these thresholds, the merger 
may not proceed. 
3. Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to provide a 
defense or immunity to any acquisition that would otherwise violate any of 
the other federal or state antitrust laws. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed 
to authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited or made illegal by 
other antitrust laws. 
4. This law shall apply to all transactions announced or commenced after 
January 1, 2020. All of the amounts contained in Section 7(B) shall be 
adjusted for inflation by the FTC, which will use the Consumer Price Index 
for this purpose and will annually publish the revised asset thresholds to 
which this law applies. 
5. Authority to enforce compliance with this section is vested in the 
Attorney General of the United States and the Federal Trade Commission. 
 
Note: this proposed legislation modifies and updates S. 600, a Bill 
introduced by Senator Kennedy in 1979. For the language of Senator 
Kennedy’s Bill see Joseph F. Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: The 
Need for Legislation, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 893–94 (1979). 
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APPENDIX II  
Nicholas Jordan* 
 
Number of Mergers & Acquisitions Where Both Firms’ Assets Exceeded 
Specified Amounts 
A CAVEAT CONCERNING THIS MATERIAL IN THIS APPENDIX 
Many of the values, dispositions, and classifications in this Appendix are 
subject to a number of potentially important qualifications and judgement 
calls. The material is of course based upon a variety of sources. Although 
every attempt was made to use only reliable sources, some of these sources 
may be more reliable than others. Further, some disparities exist between 
sources as to the true value of some of the transactions. For example, some 
sources report acquired debt and some do not, some sources report final 
transaction price while others only report the initial offer price, 
etc. Additionally, many sources do not disclose or fully disclose under what 
conditions the merger or acquisition was permitted. We expect there to be at 
 
* J.D. expected May 2020, University of Baltimore, School of Law. 
  $10B+ $25B+ $50B+ $75B+ $100B+ Total 
2019  24 13 7 1 – 24 
2018  16 6 1 – – 16 
2017  14 6 3 1 1 14 
2016  14 7 4 3 1 14 
2015  24 14 8 3 2 24 
Total  92 46 23 8 4 92 
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least a few instances where a merger we marked as “permitted in full” was 
actually limited in some way, yet these limitations were not mentioned in the 
sources we found. Some of these limitations may have been trivial and not 
worth considering. But others might actually have been significant, even 
though to a reporter or a researcher reading news accounts they seem 
unimportant. Indeed, even defining a transaction as a “merger or acquisition” 
instead of a joint venture or acquisition followed by a spin-off can be a 
judgement call. See, for example, the Dell/Vmware transaction, described 
in Samuel Stebbins, The 10 Biggest Mergers and Acquisitions of 2018, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
money/business/2018/12/10/mergers-and-acquisitions-2018-10-biggest-
corporate-consolidations/38666639/ [https://perma.cc/RGB8-96VB]; 
Energy Transfer Equity, FORTUNE (Mar. 29, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/fortune500/energy-transfer-equity/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20191121075450/https://fortune.com/fortune5
00/2019/energy-transfer/]. See also Andrew Bary, Dell’s Public Debut 
Produces Fresh Winners and Losers, BARRON’S (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/dell-buys-out-vmware-tracker-goes-
public-51546020573. 
Lastly, these tables include events that occurred between January 1, 2015 
and December 31, 2019. 
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STATUS OF EACH ATTEMPTED MERGER OR ACQUISITION: SUMMARY 
 
  
 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 Total 
Blocked by a U.S. 
court on antitrust 
grounds 






– – – 1 – 1 
Blocked on non-








decree under U.S. 
antitrust law 
– – – 1 1 2 
Approved subject 
to spin offs and 
divestitures under 
U.S. antitrust law 
5 3 7 8 6 29 
Unchallenged and 
permitted in full 9 11 6 2 14 42 
Challenged under 
U.S. antitrust law 
but eventually 
permitted in full 
1 – – 1 – 2 
Pending 7 2 – – – 9 
Total 24 16 14 14 24 92 
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MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS WHERE BOTH FIRMS’ ASSETS EXCEEDED $10 
BILLION 
 
 Merger Value Disposition 
2019 Philip Morris Int’l/ Altria Groupi $95B 




Approved subject to spin offs and 


















Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawxii 




Abandoned on non-antitrust 
groundsxvi 
 Fiserv/ 
First Dataxvii $38.2B 







$35B Unchallenged and permitted in fullxx 
 BB&T/SunTrustxxi $29.7B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 



















$21.5B Unchallenged and permitted in fullxxviii 
 Danaher/GE 
Biopharmaxxix $21.4B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 







Challenged under U.S. antitrust 




Approved subject to spin offs and 







 CBS/Viacomxxxvii $11.8 Unchallenged and permitted in fullxxxviii 
 Pfizer/Arrayxxxix $11.4B Unchallenged and permitted in fullxl 
 Asahi/Carlton & 
United Breweriesxli $11.3B Pending
xlii 
 Broadcom/ Symantecxliii $10.7B 






$10.4B Unchallenged and permitted in fullxlvi 
 Newmont Mining/ Goldcorpxlvii $10B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fullxlviii 
2018 T-Mobile/Sprintxlix $58B Pending (currently at trial)l 
 Cigna/ 
Express Scriptsli $42.3B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 







$40B Unchallenged and permitted in fullliv 
 Comcast/Skylv $35.7B Unchallenged and permitted in fulllvi 
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 IBM/Red Hat 
Inc.lvii $34B 







Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawlx 
 Broadcom/ 
CA Technologieslxi $18.9B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fulllxii 
 Harris Corp./L3 
Technologieslxiii $18.6B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 







$18.6B Unchallenged and permitted in fulllxvi 
 
Financial & Risk 
US Holdings/ 
Refinitivlxvii 
$17B Unchallenged and permitted in fulllxviii 
 Walmart/ 
Flipkartlxix $16B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fulllxx 
 AXA/XLlxxi $15.3B Unchallenged and permitted in fulllxxii 
 Dominion Energy/ 
SCANAlxxiii $14B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fulllxxiv 
 Altria Group/ Juul Labs Inc.lxxv $12.8B 




Unchallenged and permitted in 
fulllxxviii 
 Conagra Brands/ 
Pinnacle Foodslxxix $10.9B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fulllxxx 
2017 Broadcom/ Qualcommlxxxi $110B 
Blocked on non-antitrust 
groundslxxxii 
 Disney/21st 
Century Foxlxxxiii $71B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawlxxxiv 
 CVS/Aetnalxxxv $69B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawlxxxvi 
 Linde AG/ 
Praxairlxxxvii $39.7B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawlxxxviii 








Approved subject to spin offs and 







Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawxcii 
 Becton Dickinson/ 
C. R. Bardxciii $24B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 







Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawxcvi 
 Bain Capital/ 
Toshibaxcvii $17.8B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fullxcviii 
 Reckitt Benckiser/ 
Mead Johnsonxcix $16.7B Unchallenged and permitted in full
c 





$14.6B Unchallenged and permitted in fullciv 
 Amazon/ 
Whole Foodscv $13.7B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fullcvi 
 Gilead Sciences/ 
Kite Pharmacvii $11.9B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fullcviii 
2016 Anheuser-Busch/ SABMillercix $100B 
Approved subject to a conduct-




Challenged under U.S. antitrust 







Abandoned after U.S. antitrust 
challenge threatened or 
announcedcxiv 
 Bayer/Monsantocxv $66B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 




Blocked on non-antitrust 
groundscxviii 






St. Jude Medicalcxix 
$30.6B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 




Approved subject to spin offs and 








Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawcxxiv 
 
Towers Watson & 
Co./Willis Group 
Holdingscxxv 
$18B Unchallenged and permitted in fullcxxvi 
 Johnson Controls/ 
Tycocxxvii $16.6B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 







Approved subject to spin offs and 







Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawcxxxii 
 Fortis/ITCcxxxiii $11.4B Unchallenged and permitted in fullcxxxiv 
 Sherwin-Williams/ 
Valsparcxxxv $11.3B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawcxxxvi 
2015 Pfizer/ Allergancxxxvii $160B 
Abandoned on non-antitrust 
groundscxxxviii 
 Dow Chemical/ 
DuPontcxxxix $130B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 





me Warner Cablecxli 
$79.6B 
Approved subject to a conduct-
oriented consent decree under U.S. 
antitrust lawcxlii 
 Royal Dutch Shell/ 
BG Groupcxliii $70B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fullcxliv 
 Dell/EMCcxlv $66B Unchallenged and permitted in fullcxlvi 
 Heinz/Kraftcxlvii $62.6B Unchallenged and permitted in fullcxlviii 
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Approved subject to spin offs and 












$37.2B Unchallenged and permitted in fullclvi 
 Aetna/Humanaclvii $37B Blocked by a U.S. court on antitrust groundsclviii 
 Mylan/Perrigoclix $35.3B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 






$32.3B Unchallenged and permitted in fullclxii 
 Shire/Baxaltaclxiii $32B Unchallenged and permitted in fullclxiv 
 AbbVie/ 
Pharmacyclicsclxv $21B 
Unchallenged and permitted in 
fullclxvi 
 Pfizer/Hospiraclxvii $17B 
Approved subject to spin offs and 
divestitures under U.S. antitrust 
lawclxviii 







Approved subject to spin offs and 







Approved subject to spin offs and 







$13.8B Unchallenged and permitted in fullclxxvi 







$13.8B Unchallenged and permitted in fullclxxviii 
 United Healthcare/ 
Catamaranclxxix $12.8B 











$11B Unchallenged and permitted in fullclxxxiv 
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